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MAKING CONSUMER FINANCE WORK 
Natasha Sarin* 
The financial crisis exposed major fault lines in banking and 
financial markets more broadly. Policymakers responded with far-
reaching regulation that created a new agency—the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau—and changed the structure and function of 
these markets. 
Consumer advocates cheered reforms as welfare enhancing, while 
the financial sector declared that consumers would be harmed by 
interventions. With a decade of data now available, this Article 
examines the successes and failures of the consumer finance reform 
agenda. Specifically, it marshals data from every zip code and bank in 
the United States to test the efficacy of three of the most significant 
postcrisis reforms: in the debit, credit, and overdraft markets. 
The results are surprising. Despite cosmetic similarities, these 
reforms had very different outcomes. Two (changes in the credit and 
overdraft markets) increase consumer welfare, while the other (in the 
debit market) decreases it. These findings run counter to prior work by 
prominent legal scholars and encourage reevaluation of our 
(mis)conceptions about the efficacy of regulation. 
The evidence leads to several insights for regulatory design. First, 
banks regularly levy hidden fees on consumers, obscuring the true cost 
of financial products. Regulators should restrict such practices. Second, 
consumer finance markets are regressive: Low-income customers often 
pay higher prices than their higher-income counterparts. Regulators 
should address this inequity. Finally, banks tend to discourage 
regulation by promising their costs will be passed through to consumers. 
Regulators should not be overly swayed by their dire warnings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Great Recession was the worst economic downturn in the 
United States since the Depression. More Americans lost their jobs than 
at any time since World War II.1 More than two million businesses closed 
their doors because they could not make payroll.2 Nearly eight million 
families lost their homes.3 The average American household lost one-
third of its net worth.4 
Outrage about the Recession stems from the following inequity: 
Although bank executives’ risky bets caused the crisis, the lives of many 
consumers were ruined by it.5 President Obama acknowledged exactly 
this upon taking office in 2009: “For years, too many Wall Street execu-
tives made imprudent and dangerous decisions, seeking profits with too 
little regard for risk, too little regulatory scrutiny, and too little account-
ability.”6 
While the President could not undo the pain inflicted by the 
Recession, he promised policymakers would overhaul financial markets 
to better protect consumers going forward.7 As a result, a new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was tasked with policing consumer 
finance markets. It would focus on preventing families from being 
steered into the risky subprime mortgages whose collapse had kickstarted 
a global recession. But it would also protect consumers more broadly 
from nefarious practices in product markets ranging from payday loans 
to consumer checking accounts and credit lending. The hope was for the 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See Barack Obama, President Elect, Speech on the Economy, N.Y. Times (Jan. 8, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/us/politics/08text-obama.html [https:// 
perma.cc/ST22-WKA6]; see also Chris Isidore, Job Loss: Worst in 34 Years, CNN Money 
(Feb. 6, 2009), https://money.cnn.com/2009/02/06/news/economy/jobs_january/ 
index.htm [https://perma.cc/CC7Z-V6HM]. 
 2. The Great Recession: Over but Not Gone?, Northwestern Inst. for Policy Research, 
https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/about/news/2014/IPR-research-Great-Recession-
unemployment-foreclosures-safety-net-fertility-public-opinion.html [https://perma.cc/ 
ED2T-KFQE] (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 3. Kari Paul & Jacob Passy, A Decade After the Housing Crisis, Foreclosures Still 
Haunt Homeowners, MarketWatch (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story 
/a-decade-after-the-housing-crisis-foreclosures-still-haunt-homeowners-2018-09-27 
[https://perma.cc/39T6-XGTJ]. 
 4. Colin Schultz, The Average American Household Lost a Third of Its Net Worth 
During the Recession, Smithsonian.com (July 29, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag. 
com/smart-news/average-american-household-lost-third-their-net-worth-during-recession-
180952191/ [https://perma.cc/5778-AQWR]. 
 5. Marilyn Geewax, Unhappy 10th Anniversary, Great Recession. You Still Hurt Us, 
NPR (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/14/570556990/unhappy-10th-
anniversary-great-recession-you-still-hurt-us [https://perma.cc/FJQ9-CK3K]. 
 6. See Obama, supra note 1. 
 7. Kimberly Amadeo, Obama 2008 Economic Promises and Platform, The Balance, 
https://www.thebalance.com/obama-2008-economic-promises-and-platform-3305774 
[https://perma.cc/QA9V-ERTK] (last updated June 25, 2019). 
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CFPB to tilt the scales of power away from large, sophisticated financial 
institutions and in favor of consumers. 
However, the institutions affected by the CFPB’s oversight said 
changes would end up hurting, rather than helping, consumers. For 
example, in May 2010, Senator Dick Durbin cheered the passage of his 
namesake legislation, the “Durbin Amendment” (Durbin). Durbin caps 
debit interchange fees, which are the fees merchants pay card issuers to 
process electronic transactions.8 Senator Durbin proclaimed that “Wall 
Street reform is really about two things: holding big banks accountable 
for how they operate and empowering consumers to make good financial 
choices. Passage of this amendment is a win for the public on both 
fronts. . . . [S]mall businesses and their customers will be able to keep 
more of their own money.”9 
However, the large financial institutions that lost revenue because of 
Durbin warned that consumers would be harmed by its passage: “Who is 
going to pay for this? That Customer that gets that debit card for free,” 
assured the CEO of TCF, a midsize Minnesota-based bank.10 Bank of Amer-
ica executives called Durbin a “windfall to large merchants” that would 
increase consumer costs.11 
Similarly, a year before Durbin, Congress passed the Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act (CARD Act), limiting 
banks’ ability to levy credit card penalty fees and hike interest rates. Con-
sumer advocates cheered the reform: “Amidst the financial turmoil on 
Wall Street, today the House took steps to help those on Main Street . . . . 
This historic legislation will help working families . . . .”12 
Yet the financial industry assured legislators this would not be the 
case. They argued that the CARD Act would instead increase the cost of 
credit for consumers and small businesses: In fact, Jamie Dimon, the 
                                                                                                                           
 8. Press Release, Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Durbin 
Statement on His Debit Card Swipe Fee Amendment (May 13, 2010), https://www. 
durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-statement-on-his-debit-card-swipe-fee-
amendment [https://perma.cc/2RL7-X54F] [hereinafter Durbin, Statement on Swipe Fee 
Amendment]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Letter from Brian J. Hurd, Exec. Vice President, TCF Nat’l Bank, to Jennifer J. 
Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 18, 2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/April/20110405/R-1404/R-1404_030411_ 
68936_437488369604_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HLK-DJ8L]. 
 11. Letter from Karl F. Kaufmann, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am., to Jennifer J. 
Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 22, 2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/March/20110302/R-1404/R-1404_022211_ 
67233_584174234336_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H57U-Y7BQ]. 
 12. Connie Prater, House Passes Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Bill, 
Creditcards.com (Sept. 23, 2008), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-
cardholders-bill-rights-house-vote-pass-1282.php [https://perma.cc/ZQV4-E2LP](internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rep. Carolyn Maloney). 
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CEO of JPMorgan, warned that, in response, his bank would stop offer-
ing credit cards to 15% of its customers.13 
And again, when the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve or 
Board) proposed changes to the overdraft regime to limit banks’ ability 
to levy overdraft fees, industry participants warned of dire consequences. 
“If this folly happens, we estimate that we will close 10–15% of our 
consumer accounts. Be careful what you wish, we serve these folks well,” 
cautioned an executive at Bridge Community Bank.14 
Who got the better of these debates? Did these sweeping regulations 
ultimately limit abusive bank practices or instead hamper industries and 
deprive consumers of beneficial financial products or services? A decade 
removed from the crisis, the time is ripe to examine the successes—and 
failures—of the consumer reform agenda. This Article relies on empiri-
cal evidence to evaluate postcrisis consumer financial regulation. The 
results are surprising and provide guidance to policymakers about how to 
design regulation and evaluate its efficacy. 
This is a critical undertaking. More than a decade removed from the 
crisis, new risks are emerging in consumer finance markets: More than 
50% of mortgages are now originated in the lightly-regulated shadow 
banking sector,15 student loan balances have exploded,16 and the sub-
prime auto loan bubble appears on the verge of collapse.17 In their 
seminal 2008 work, Professor Oren Bar-Gill and then-Professor Elizabeth 
Warren called on policymakers to make credit “safer” by creating a new 
federal regulator, now known as the CFPB, with the authority and 
incentives to police consumer finance markets.18 As consumer advocates 
                                                                                                                           
 13. Eileen AJ Connelly, Mixed Blessing: Credit Card Reform May Shock Some, Seattle 
Times (Feb. 22, 2010), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/mixed-blessing-credit-card-
reform-may-shock-some/ [https://perma.cc/67C4-N7CU]. 
 14. Memorandum from Robert A. Steen to Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. 
(Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2010/March/20100326/R-1343/ 
R-1343_032510_32327_341354941882_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C97C-6MVG]. 
 15. See Michele Lerner, The Mortgage Market Is Now Dominated by Non-Bank 
Lenders, Wash. Post (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/the-
mortgage-market-is-now-dominated-by-nonbank-lenders/2017/02/22/9c6bf5fc-d1f5-11e6-
a783-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 16. See Annie Nova, For Some Students, What They Borrow Can End Up Being a 
Fraction of What They Wind Up Owing, CNBC (June 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/06/07/peoples-student-loan-balances-are-spiraling-out-of-control.html [https://perma.cc/ 
7529-HLPN]. 
 17. See Cecile Gutscher, Subprime Auto Debt Is Booming Even as Defaults Soar, 
Bloomberg (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/never-
mind-defaults-debt-backed-by-subprime-auto-loans-is-hot (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 18. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 
98–101 (2008) (“The failure of current attempts at regulation of credit-product safety 
prompts us to propose the creation of a new federal regulator—a Financial Product Safety 
Commission or a new consumer credit division within an existing agency (the [Federal 
Reserve Board] or [Federal Trade Commission]).”). 
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wield this authority, the success of the reform agenda relies on heeding 
the lessons learned from the triumphs and failures of past regulatory 
interventions. Only then can we successfully course correct, where 
necessary, to best serve consumer interests. 
This Article begins by analyzing three of the most important 
postcrisis consumer reforms: the Durbin Amendment affecting the debit 
market; the CARD Act concerning the credit market; and varied reforms 
to the overdraft market. It draws insights from big data, relying on a 
unique dataset of effective interchange rates for 120 industries in 40,000 
zip codes in the United States (totaling more than 10 million observa-
tions); branch-level data on checking account fees reported weekly for 
58,000 bank branches in the United States; and financial regulatory data 
reported quarterly by each of the 4,800 bank holding companies in the 
United States. This Article demonstrates that these three regulations 
have varied efficacy—two (overdraft reform and the CARD Act) benefit 
consumers, while one (the Durbin Amendment) exacerbates the market 
failures it should have corrected. It is surprising that similarly situated 
interventions have different impacts, and these findings refute promi-
nent prior scholarship. 
This Article then uses the empirical evidence to glean lessons for 
regulatory design. Unlike much of the literature, this Article does not 
assess a single intervention.19 Instead, it tests the efficacy of the broader 
consumer reform project by comparing the design and effectiveness of 
interventions in distinct markets. Based on this analysis, the Article offers 
explicit guidance for both how to regulate and how to analyze the inci-
dence of regulation. These suggestions are threefold. First, regulators 
should target salience problems: Many consumers are incognizant of or 
ignore hidden prices—like the cost of overdrafting or late fees—and so 
end up paying more than they expect for financial products.20 This is a 
market failure that well-designed regulation can solve. Second, regulators 
should heed the fact that our financial markets are regressive. As this 
                                                                                                                           
 19. For analysis of the CARD Act, see generally Sumit Agarwal, Souphala 
Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, Regulating Consumer Financial 
Products: Evidence from Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. Econ. 111 (2014) [hereinafter Agarwal et 
al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products]; Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card 
Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 967 (2012); Vikram Jambulapati & 
Joanna Stavins, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: What Did Banks Do?, 46 J. Banking & Fin. 
21 (2014); Scott T. Nelson, Private Information and Price Regulation in the US Credit 
Card Market (July 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://economics.mit.edu/files/ 
14225 [https://perma.cc/E7ER-HJP5] [hereinafter Nelson, Private Information]. For 
analysis of the Durbin Amendment, see generally Benjamin S. Kay, Mark D. Manuszak & 
Cindy M. Vojtech, Competition and Complementarities in Retail Banking: Evidence from 
Debit Card Interchange Regulation, 34 J. Fin. Intermediation 91 (2018); Vladimir 
Mukharlyamov & Natasha Sarin, The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Banks, 
Merchants, and Consumers (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3048&context=faculty_scholarship 
[https://perma.cc/6QUN-Y9BR]. 
 20. See infra section II.B. 
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Article illustrates, low-income consumers tend to pay higher prices than 
their higher-income counterparts.21 This is because wealthier consumers 
tend to be more sophisticated and have more access to the most 
attractive financial products.22  Well-designed regulation can decrease 
unfair cross-subsidization, though poorly designed regulation can exacer-
bate it. Finally, when analyzing regulation, policymakers and academics 
should focus on what banks do—not what they say. Financial institutions 
have every incentive to dissuade regulators by stating that consumers will 
be harmed, not helped, by intervention.23 They repeat this dire warning 
each time lawmakers act, and as a result, many policymakers and academ-
ics believe regulation is futile.24 The data show that regulation can work 
and that relying too much on banks’ cautions will lead to mistaken 
pessimism about the regulatory project.25 
Part I of this Article begins with analysis of the Durbin Amendment, 
which capped debit interchange fees. Prior to Durbin, a merchant would 
typically pay around 2% of the value of a customer’s debit transaction to 
their bank to cover the cost of processing that transaction.26 Post-Durbin, 
these fees are capped at $0.22.27 Thus, pre-Durbin, a merchant paid $2 to 
process a $100 transaction, and post-Durbin, they pay only $0.22, about 
one-tenth of the previous fee. As a result, banks lost—and merchants 
saved—$6.5 billion annually.28 The policy objective was for these mer-
chant savings to pass through to consumers in the form of lower retail 
prices.29 However, this Article is the first to show empirically that consum-
ers were harmed, not helped, by the passage of this legislation. Banks 
respond to Durbin by increasing consumer account fees to recover a 
significant share of lost interchange revenue. And merchants in large 
part eat the gains from Durbin, failing to fully pass through cost savings 
                                                                                                                           
 21. See infra section II.B. 
 22. See infra section II.B. 
 23. See infra section II.C. 
 24. See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World, 69 
Am. Econ. Rev., May 1979, at 1, 11 (“The regulatory rule is: each time the dike springs a 
leak, plug it with one of your fingers; just as dynamic industry will perpetually find ways of 
opening new holes in the dike, so an ingenious regulator will never run out of fingers.”). 
 25. See infra sections II.C.1–.2. 
 26. See, e.g., Durbin, Statement on Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 8 (noting that 
at the time of the amendment’s passage, Visa and MasterCard charged interchange fees of 
around 1–2% of the transaction amount). 
 27. See 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2019). To be precise, the fee consists of a $0.21 cap plus 
5 basis points times the value of the transaction, with a $0.01 adjustment allowed to cover 
the implementation of antifraud measures. In practice, nearly all transactions are charged 
$0.22. See The Durbin Amendment, Advocharge, https://advocharge.com/the-durbin-
amendment/ [https://perma.cc/AND3-5P85] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019) (“Essentially, the 
final cost is 5 basis points and $.22 for normal debit card transactions.”). 
 28. See infra section I.A.3. 
 29. Margarette Burnette, The Durbin Amendment Explained, Nerdwallet, 
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/durbin-amendment-explained/ [https:// 
perma.cc/G4TB-QJ3Z] (last updated Aug. 30, 2017). 
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to customers.30 In fact, Durbin is regressive, because only low-income 
consumers bear new bank fees. Additionally, because Durbin caps 
debit—but not credit—interchange, banks evade its impact by encourag-
ing greater use of unregulated credit cards, which traps consumers in 
expensive cycles of debt.31 
The Article next considers the CARD Act, which, like Durbin, sought 
to decrease consumer costs. Prior to the CARD Act, banks increased 
credit card interest rates without warning and levied exorbitant penalty 
fees. As a result, credit was significantly more expensive—particularly for 
low-income consumers who are most often hit by penalty fees—than con-
sumers anticipated. The CARD Act restricted how issuers price credit—
for example, by requiring notice before increasing interest rates and by 
capping late fees.32 Unlike Durbin, the CARD Act achieved its intended 
effect: Consumers save around $12 billion annually.33 There is no evi-
dence that issuers changed other aspects of credit card prices left 
unregulated by the CARD Act to compensate for losses in interest and 
penalty fee revenue.34 
Finally, this Article analyzes changes to the overdraft regime. In the 
decade preceding the financial crisis, overdraft fees became one of the 
fastest-growing sources of bank revenue. Consumers could effectively pay 
$40 for their morning coffee (thanks to a $35 overdraft fee) by using 
their debit cards without sufficient funds in their checking accounts. 
Postcrisis, regulators required that banks affirmatively opt in consumers 
to overdraft protection before levying overdraft fees. If a consumer is not 
opted in and tries to use a debit card to make a purchase, their bank will 
decline the transaction. As a result of this new default rule, the share of 
consumer accounts eligible for overdraft protection decreased by 84%.35 
Empirical analysis disproves the popular consensus among legal academ-
ics that the overdraft default rule fails to achieve its ends. Specifically, this 
Article shows that due to this intervention, banks lost 15% of their 
                                                                                                                           
 30. The evidence on merchant response to Durbin is based on the gas station 
industry. The gas station industry is an ideal market to examine because pricing in the 
industry is local and involves only a few products. It is, of course, possible that this 
adjustment does not reflect price movements in other industries for which we lack data.  
 31. See infra section I.A.4. 
 32. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-24, § 101, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735–36 (2009). 
 33. See infra section I.B.3. 
 34. See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 19, at 999 (“[T]hrough our data, we saw 
significant reductions in two types of fees directly regulated by the CARD Act that provide 
a substantial source of revenue for credit card issuers . . . but no substantial increases in 
other credit card rates and fees to compensate for the consequent loss in fee revenue.”). 
 35. CFPB, CFPB Study of Overdraft Programs 29 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance. 
gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N4B-EXW2] 
[hereinafter CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs] (finding that only 16.1% of accounts in a 
2012 CFPB study affirmatively opted in for overdraft coverage). 
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precrisis overdraft revenue, and there is no evidence that banks offset 
these losses.36 
At first glance, these three interventions appear similar. They involve 
the same financial institutions, and each is a price regulation that de-
creases banks’ fee revenue. In each intervention, regulators and academ-
ics voiced concerns about the possibility of regulatory “whack-a-mole”37—
that is, in response to well-intentioned interventions that reduce revenue, 
banks would adjust other rates and fees.38 However, the data reveal that 
banks offset losses only from the interchange fee cap—not from de-
creases in credit card and overdraft revenue. Why? 
One answer is salience. Many consumers are prone to well-
documented behavioral limitations.39 One such limitation is the tendency 
to focus on prominent (“salient”) aspects of a price bundle—for exam-
ple the cost of an airline ticket in bold, large letters on Expedia—but 
ignore aspects that are less clearly displayed (for example, the cost of 
checking a bag or changing that reservation). Firms have no incentive to 
compete to offer low nonsalient prices because most consumers ignore 
them. In fact, firms purposely charge high nonsalient prices, so they can 
offer low salient prices and attract the most customers. Consumer finan-
cial contracts have become increasingly complicated over time—the 
average credit card contract used to be one page long but now averages 
more than thirty pages.40 Sophisticated banks charge low or no salient 
prices such as a 0% annual percentage rate (APR) or a checking account 
with a $0 monthly fee. They tuck away high nonsalient fees deep in 
contracts that no one, not even the most sophisticated law professor 
among us, would ever read. The data reveal that when regulators restrict 
nonsalient fees—as did the CARD Act and overdraft reform—banks are 
unlikely to pass the costs of these interventions through to consumers. 
As such, Part II of this Article begins with the first lesson for 
regulators: Policymakers should regulate nonsalient prices. The CARD 
Act and overdraft reform did just this: They can be understood as re-
                                                                                                                           
 36. See infra section II.A. 
 37. “Whack-a-mole” is an arcade game. Players use a mallet to hit moles back into 
their holes. When one mole disappears, another rises. The objective is to hit as many 
moles as possible in a certain period of time. Whack-a-Mole, Lexico, https://www.lexico.com 
/en/definition/whack-a-mole [https://perma.cc/V5FP-KZJH] (last visited July 25, 2019). 
 38. See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, The Case for 
Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in New Perspectives on Regulation 25, 50 (David Moss 
& John Cisternino eds., 2009) (voicing concern that regulation that reduces revenue from 
penalty fees would mean that other rates and fees would be adjusted to compensate, and 
there is little reason to believe that the adjustments would be in consumers’ favor). 
 39. Behavioral economists focus on theoretically and empirically demonstrating 
human deviations from rational behavior. Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky pioneered early work in this field. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251–78 (1986) 
(discussing how the modern theory of decisionmaking is at risk). 
 40. Benjamin Sarlin, Elizabeth Warren Talks Bank Reform, Daily Beast (Apr. 21, 
2010), https://www.thedailybeast.com/elizabeth-warren-talks-bank-reform [https://perma.cc/ 
TU27-4HAB]. 
1528 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1519 
 
stricting banks’ ability to hide fees on page twenty-six of that thirty-page 
contract. In light of these restrictions, banks faced a choice. To offset 
these losses, they would have had to raise salient prices (for instance, 
increase the introductory APR on page one of the credit card contract) 
and risk losing market share by increasing a price consumers pay atten-
tion to. JPMorgan is the largest lender in the country, and its credit card 
business contributes to its nearly $100 billion41 in revenue—why risk 
alienating its customer base over relatively minor ($750 million42) CARD 
Act losses? JPMorgan—and other large financial institutions—did not ad-
just salient prices in response to regulation of nonsalient prices. The 
result is an increase in overall consumer welfare. 
 This Article also proposes a novel alternative to direct regulation of 
nonsalient prices: a “salience shock.” The approach is simple—many 
consumers ignore penalty fees because they are inattentive (for example, 
they do not realize they are about to overdraft) or overly optimistic (for 
instance, they do not believe they will ever be delinquent in repaying 
their credit card balances).43 A timely “shock” that focuses their atten-
tion, like a notification immediately before overdrafting, will decrease 
the incidence of costly consumer mistakes. A recent reform in the United 
Kingdom provides evidence to support this view: Banks that give custom-
ers text-message alerts about low account balances find overdraft inci-
dence declines by around 25%.44   
As each of the postcrisis interventions studied illustrates, consumer 
finance markets regularly feature cross-subsidies running from low-in-
come consumers to their wealthy counterparts. The second lesson of this 
Article is that well-designed regulation should address these cross-
subsidies. 
This is true in markets where salience problems exist. Hidden fees 
are most often borne by low-income consumers: Nine percent of bank 
customers—disproportionately low income and less educated—are 
responsible for 84% of banks’ overdraft income.45 Additionally, lower-
income customers are less likely to pay their credit card bills on time,46 
                                                                                                                           
 41. $750 million is approximately 3% of JP Morgan’s 2017 net revenue 
(approximately $25 billion after accounting for expenses)—certainly not insignificant, but 
not a large contributor. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report 2017, at 3, 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/investor-relations/document/annualreport-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H7A-JTHF]. 
 42. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, JP Morgan’s Dimon Says New Laws Have Hurt His 
Company, Wash. Post (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2010/04/01/AR2010040103684.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 43. See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 44. Press Release, Competition & Mkts. Auth., New Overdraft Alerts as CMA Banking 
Rules Come into Force (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-
overdraft-alerts-as-cma-banking-rules-come-into-force [https://perma.cc/RUX2-X4BZ]. 
 45. See CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 18. 
 46. Gerri Detweiler, How Rich People Use Credit Cards Differently from the Rest of 
Us, Credit.com (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-rich-people-use-
credit-cards-differently-than-the-rest-of-us-2015-2 [https://perma.cc/HA8Y-5555]. 
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and the high fees they pay subsidize cheaper credit for the rest of the 
population. 
But cross-subsidization also exists in financial markets without sali-
ence problems, because wealthier customers have access to more 
attractive products. Consumers all pay the same price for retail goods, 
even though some transact with cash (no processing fee for merchants) 
and others use rewards cards (3% to 5% processing fee for merchants). 
Financial firms benefit from high card processing fees, but so do 
consumers who transact with these cards: A wealthy customer who uses a 
platinum American Express to buy a new pair of $100 sneakers gets 
airline miles and cash back.47 If the value of those rewards totals $2 (such 
as a 2% cash back), they effectively pay only $98 for new shoes. A cus-
tomer who uses cash pays the full $100. This may seem miniscule, but it 
scales quickly: On average, card-using households receive nearly $1,200 
from cash users each year.48 This is a regressive transfer: Your airline 
miles are subsidized by low-income consumers who do not have access to 
credit. 
The existence of these cross-subsidies justifies regulatory 
intervention. The CFPB has broad power to prohibit abusive or unfair 
bank practices that the consumer cannot reasonably avoid.49 The pay-
ments market is a prime candidate for CFPB intervention, because one 
group of consumers (low income) pays higher prices and cannot 
reasonably avoid these higher prices without access to rewards cards. 
Curbing banks’ loyalty rewards programs will decrease these cross-
subsidies. A less radical alternative is to allow merchants to price discrimi-
nate—for example, by charging higher prices to the wealthy, who pay 
with rewards cards with high processing fees; or at the very least, by 
allowing merchants to nudge consumers toward using payment instru-
ments with lower processing fees.50 
Importantly, when policymakers debate regulation they often ask 
whether it will increase overall consumer welfare. This focus is misplaced. 
Removing cross-subsidies in consumer finance markets may not help all 
consumers, because the wealthy benefit from the status quo. However, 
                                                                                                                           
 47. See infra section II.B. 
 48. Scott Schuh, Oz Shy & Joanna Stavins, Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit 
Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Pub. Pol’y 
Discussion Papers No. 10-03, 2010). 
 49. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2012) (“The Bureau is authorized to exercise its 
authorities under Federal consumer financial law for the purposes of ensuring that, with 
respect to consumer financial products and services . . . consumers are protected from 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination . . . .”). 
 50. See generally Natasha Sarin, What’s in Your Wallet (and What Should the Law Do 
About It?), 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(arguing that given recent judicial barriers to merchant price discrimination, it is 
appropriate for the CFPB to use its authority to curtail “unfair, abusive, and deceptive 
practices” to facilitate merchants’ encouraging consumers to use payment instruments 
with lower interchange fees). 
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regulation that creates a more equitable financial system and increases 
the welfare of the most financially fragile is desirable.51 
Finally, the empirical analysis demonstrates that policymakers and 
academics should heed what banks do in response to regulation, not 
what they say they will do. Every time regulators act, affected institutions 
claim that the result will be harm, not benefit, for consumers. These 
warnings lead consumer advocates to be skeptical of the desirability of 
what we now know are welfare-enhancing reforms, like restricting credit 
card late fees.52 They also lead academics to proclaim that “light-touch” 
regulatory approaches are futile, because sophisticated institutions will 
always pass along the costs of regulation to consumers.53 Instead of 
interventions that restrict markets but allow consumers to freely choose 
between diverse products, these critics advocate for more heavy-handed 
approaches, like mandates banning certain financial products.54 
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom about the inevitable 
failure of light-touch regulation. Prominent legal scholarship by Profes-
sor Lauren Willis and Professors Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes question 
the effectiveness of behavioral policies, like the new opt-in default rule 
for overdraft protection. They suggest that since firms rationally optimize 
and consumers do not, light-touch regulation will not be effective, 
because firms will rationally offset it and default consumers into the 
choice that is most profitable for the firm. In the case of overdraft, this 
means that firms will work to opt-in consumers.55 
There are theoretical reasons to believe that firms will offset 
regulation in the manner these authors describe.56 Firms themselves say 
                                                                                                                           
 51. See infra section II.B.2. 
 52. See Barr et al., supra note 38, at 50. 
 53. See generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims 
Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1593 (2013). This Article adopts the term “light-touch” 
from Professors Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes to refer to regulatory approaches that 
preserve a role for consumer choice. To understand the difference between “light-touch” 
and more heavy-handed regulatory approaches, consider the difference between the new 
overdraft opt-in rules (which change the default but leave the market unchanged for 
consumers who like overdraft as a product), see JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 41, 
and the Bubb and Pildes proposal to ban overdraft as a product (which would overhaul 
the overdraft market, even for consumers who would prefer it unchanged), see Bubb & 
Pildes, supra, at 1657–58. While the new opt-in rules are an example of a light-touch 
regulation, both the CARD Act and Durbin are more heavy handed. 
 54. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1658 (“Policy can offer more . . . than just 
disclosure and defaults, and the unwillingness to seriously analyze regulatory tools that go 
beyond nudges limits the role BLE [behavioral law and economics] should be playing in 
fashioning welfare-improving interventions. To illustrate, we consider two policy tools . . . : 
regulating products and reshaping firm incentives.”). 
 55. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1657. See generally Lauren E. Willis, When 
Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1155 (2013).  
 56. See Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Neale Mahoney & Johannes 
Stroebel, A Simple Framework for Estimating Consumer Benefits from Regulating Hidden 
Fees, J.L. & Econ. 5239, 5244–50 (2014) (providing a simple theoretical model that 
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they will offset regulation. However, the magnitude of this offset—and 
thus the efficacy of intervention—is ultimately an empirical question and 
one this Article undertakes with surprising results. Specifically, the data 
reveal that the new overdraft default rules are a resounding success, not a 
failure as previously believed. Despite assumptions about how banks will 
respond—based not unreasonably on how they say they will respond—
most financial institutions do not aggressively opt-in consumers but 
rather move away from overdraft as a product.57 
The implications are significant. Past authors cite the new overdraft 
default rules as a canonical example of how behavioral law and 
economics approaches do not deliver for consumers.58 However, the new 
opt-in regime does achieve its ends and does help consumers. This case is a 
paradigmatic example of how behavioral policies work, not an illustra-
tion of their limitations. Fortunately the existence of a power imbalance 
in the consumer–bank relationship does not doom all efforts at taming 
these markets. The aggressiveness with which financial institutions re-
spond to regulation varies depending on market particulars, and only by 
following the data can we glean accurate insights about regulation. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I describes 
three of the most important postcrisis consumer financial reforms—in 
the debit, credit, and overdraft markets—detailing the rationale for 
regulatory intervention and using hand-collected data to present novel 
empirical evidence on the impact of these reforms. Armed with this 
evidence, Part II then elaborates on several lessons for policymakers. 
I. POSTCRISIS INTERVENTIONS 
In the wake of the Recession, the financial sector underwent 
significant regulatory changes, many of which sought to tame consumer 
finance markets. Three of these changes—implemented through Durbin, 
the CARD Act, and amendments to Regulation E that changed the 
overdraft default rules—were price regulations aimed at decreasing 
banks’ fee revenue and increasing consumer savings. This Part considers 
the efficacy of each intervention with novel empirical analysis using data 
from every bank and every zip code in the United States. 
A.  The Durbin Amendment 
1. The Policy Problem. — The payment card system is a two-sided 
market, with cards demanded both by cardholders who use them as a 
means of purchase and merchants who accept them as payment for 
                                                                                                                           
illustrates that in a perfectly competitive market, banks will fully offset regulatory 
interventions like the CARD Act). 
 57. See infra section I.C.3. 
 58. See Willis, supra note 55, at 1181–85. 
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goods. 59  An interchange fee results from a complex series of 
transactions,60 but it can be thought of as simply the processing fee a 
customer’s bank collects from a merchant following a card transaction.61 
The two-sided nature of these markets means card networks must 
choose prices that encourage adoption by both sides of the market—
cards that merchants do not accept will not generate interchange 
revenue and neither will cards that merchants accept but consumers do 
not use.62 This two-sidedness, at least conceptually, discourages card 
networks from charging interchange fees that are too high; interchange 
fees above competitive levels will discourage merchants from accepting 
expensive cards and encourage the entry of lower-cost competitors.63 
Even so, historically, interchange rates have been challenged on 
antitrust grounds, with the earliest example being National Bancard Corp. 
(NaBanco) v. Visa USA, Inc.64 This case involved a dispute between Visa 
and NaBanco, a third-party processor of merchant card transactions, over 
the legality of interchange fees.65 NaBanco’s business model relied on it 
competing with Visa member banks to process electronic transactions for 
merchants.66 NaBanco struggled to compete with Visa member banks 
that could afford to offer lower rates to merchants because Visa gave “on-
us” transactions (where customers and merchants banked with the same 
institution) a discount.67 This case established the legality of interchange 
fees. The court concluded that this fee arrangement was “pro-competi-
tive” and no less-restrictive alternative existed to allow for the 
distribution of costs associated with payment transactions.68 
Importantly, as discussed below, these fees were always salient to the 
merchants that bear them. As a result, NaBanco was followed by a near-
                                                                                                                           
 59. Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache, 
Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card 
Interchange Fees, 73 Antitrust L.J. 571, 571 (2006). 
 60. See Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan, Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit 
Card Markets: What Role for Public Authorities? A Summary of a Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Conference, 2006 Econ. Rev. 87, 92–93 (providing an introduction to the 
mechanics of interchange fees). 
 61. Id. at 92. In general, this processing fee varies depending on the card used: 
“[C]redit cards carry the highest interchange fee, PIN debit the lowest, with signature 
debit in between.” Id. at 93. 
 62. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, An Economic Analysis of the Determination 
of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, 2 Rev. Network Econ. 69, 72 (2003), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f850/0560f04ad3a1d0abba4db4932f71ba3fa1c6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AUZ4-LN5T]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 596 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding 
interchange fee arrangements more procompetitive than anticompetitive). 
 65. Id. at 1239. 
 66. Id. at 1240. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1265. 
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constant stream of antitrust litigation69  by merchants upset at high 
interchange costs and alleging price-fixing by Visa and Mastercard, which 
together controlled 71% of the payment card market in 2008.70 Mer-
chants have successfully challenged various card-network practices as 
anticompetitive. For example, exclusivity agreements (forbidding banks 
from issuing cards from other networks if they issue cards from Visa or 
MasterCard) and “Honor-All-Cards” terms (contractual provisions that 
require that merchants who accept basic cards also accept high-price 
rewards cards issued by the same network) were deemed unlawful.71 
These changes decreased market frictions and encouraged the emer-
gence of new competitors like American Express and Discover. 
Despite increased competitive pressure, in the decade leading up to 
the crisis, card networks’ revenue from interchange expense increased 
rather than decreased, due to the growth in electronic payments and the 
introduction of rewards cards with high processing fees.72 As a result, 
interchange expense became even more significant for merchants, often 
their second-highest cost of operating after labor.73 Exploding inter-
change expense prompted calls for regulatory intervention.74 
2. Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. — Section 1075 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act75 was introduced by Senator Durbin and is colloquially 
known as the “Durbin Amendment.” In its final form, it required the 
Federal Reserve to establish rules ensuring “reasonable and 
proportional” debit interchange fees that would decrease merchant costs 
                                                                                                                           
 69. See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Appellants sued appellees under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, for antitrust violations, alleging appellees 
conspired with each other to set the fees charged to merchants, such as appellants, for 
payment of credit card sales.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 101 
(2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that merchants sought damages for alleged violations of the 
Sherman Act that resulted in plaintiffs incurring “supra-competitive ‘interchange fees’” for 
debit and credit transactions from 1992 to 2003); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 
F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The complaint charged that MasterCard and Visa U.S.A., 
which are organized as joint ventures owned by their member banking institutions, 
conspired to restrain trade . . . .”); see also Retailers Sue Visa over Fees, L.A. Times (July 
16, 2005), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-jul-16-fi-visa16-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/U7LL-AXCF]. For a full description of legal challenges to interchange 
fees, see U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-45, Rising Interchange Fees Have 
Increased Costs for Merchants, but Options for Reducing Fees Pose Challenges 40–42 
(2009). 
 70. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 69, at 19. 
 71. See Wal-Mart, 396 F.3d at 101, 103 (affirming a settlement that required the 
cessation of Visa and Mastercard’s “Honor-All-Cards” policy); United States v. Visa U.S.A., 
Inc., 344 F.3d at 24 (finding exclusivity agreements unlawful). 
 72. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 69, at 23. 
 73. Paul Gackle, The Fight over Interchange Fees, Frontline (Nov. 24, 2009), https:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/creditcards/themes/interchange.html [https://perma.cc 
/KQJ8-ESGJ]. 
 74. Pacheco & Sullivan, supra note 60, at 91. 
 75. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1693o-2 (2012)). 
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and result in lower consumer prices.76 The amendment preserved an ex-
ception for small issuers (with less than $10 billion in assets).77 Because 
of its late introduction to Dodd–Frank in May 2010, Durbin was passed 
without hearings or debate, and many took issue with the speed of its pas-
sage.78 Critics also pointed to the difficulties of prior interchange caps; 
for example, those implemented in Australia resulted in bank fee in-
creases to recover lost revenue.79 
In December 2010, the Federal Reserve proposed a rule 
implementing Durbin: a $0.12 cap per debit transaction.80 The financial 
services industry was outraged; in fact, one bank even challenged the 
                                                                                                                           
 76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(1)–(2). For this work, I focus on Durbin’s interchange 
cap. Further work remains to be done on the consequences of other aspects of the 
amendment, for example, the exclusivity and routing restrictions, which halved the 
volume for Visa’s pin-debit payment processer, Interlink, causing Visa to levy a network fee 
to encourage routing through Interlink. See Interlink Loses More than Half Its Volume as 
Durbin Routing Provisions Take Effect, Dig. Transactions (July 25, 2012), https:// 
www.digitaltransactions.net/interlink-loses-more-than-half-its-volume-as-durbin-routing-
provisions-take-effect [https://perma.cc/PL9J-MY8W]; Ursula Librizzi, Visa Increasing 
Fixed Acquirer Network Fee (FANF) Rates, PayJunction Blog (Dec. 21, 2017), https:// 
blog.payjunction.com/visa-fixed-acquirer-network-fee [https://perma.cc/W587-NRMH]. 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6). 
 78. The President of the American Bankers Association called the Durbin 
Amendment “11th hour” legislation that “hand[ed] one industry a victory without 
considering the unintended consequences of the government second-guessing the 
market.” Rob Nichols, Opinion, The Durbin Amendment: A Costly Price Control 
Experiment, Hill (June 27, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-
budget/284842-the-durbin-amendment-a-costly-price-control-experiment [https://perma.cc 
/HPN8-W68S]. An opinion piece even attacked Senator Durbin for his championing of 
interchange legislation, noting that one of the largest beneficiaries, Wal-Mart, announced 
its intention to open stores in the Chicago area (which Senator Durbin represents) and 
donated $20 million to Illinois charities on the eve of a key vote on the measure. See 
Stephen Moore, Opinion, Everyday Low Politics, Wall St. J., https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052748703571704575340951256767996 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (last updated July 2, 2010); see also Mike Mercer, Opinion, Senators Must Hear 
from Consumers, Savannah Morning News (June 6, 2010), https://www.savannahnow.com 
/column/2011-06-06/mercer-senators-must-hear-consumers [https://perma.cc/JY95-Q8A9] 
(supporting legislation that would delay the implementation of the Durbin Amendment to 
allow for public hearings). 
 79. See, e.g., Howard Chang, David S. Evans & Daniel D. Garcia Swartz, The Effect of 
Regulatory Intervention in Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee 
Capping in Australia, 4 Rev. Network Econ. 328, 337–41 (2005) (noting that banks 
increased card fees to recover lost interchange fee revenues). Note though that this 
assessment of the Australian experience is not shared by all observers. See Joseph Farrell, 
Assessing Australia Interchange Regulation: Comments on Chang, Evans and Garcia 
Swartz, 4 Rev. Network Econ. 1, 1–5 (2005) (arguing that Chang et al., supra, suffers from 
limited and noisy data and that the “correct reading” is “so far, the data doesn’t show 
much”). 
 80. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve 
Requests Comment on a Proposed Rule to Establish Debit Card Interchange Fee 
Standards and Prohibit Network Exclusivity Arrangements and Routing Restrictions (Dec. 
16, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20101216a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LRX8-A2U3]. 
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constitutionality of Durbin, arguing that the regulation forced banks to 
offer debit services at a price below cost.81 Regulators voiced concern as 
well, suggesting that the small-issuer exemption would fail in practice be-
cause networks would decrease interchange rates for large and small 
issuers alike rather than vary rates by issuer size.82 
The Federal Reserve’s final rule raised the debit interchange cap to 
$0.22 plus five basis points times the total value of the transaction. Im-
portantly, credit card interchange fees were left unregulated. This final 
rule prompted yet another constitutional challenge, this time by a coa-
lition of merchants angered by the Board’s decision to raise the fee cap 
from its initial proposal.83 The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, 
and the cap remains.84 
3. Impact of Regulatory Intervention. — Considering the effect of 
Durbin on banks and merchants can help us understand its impact on 
overall consumer welfare and help inform regulation of this market and 
of two-sided platforms more generally. 
To study how banks responded to Durbin, I rely on data from a 
variety of sources.85 Specifically, I look to bank financial statements to see 
how bank revenue changes following Durbin’s enactment (Figure 1). I 
then use data from RateWatch, which surveys bank branches weekly on 
their fee-setting practices. These data allow us to examine how bank 
checking account prices change in response to Durbin (Figures 2 and 3). 
I next use daily gas station prices to see how merchants responded to 
                                                                                                                           
 81. TCF lost in district court in South Dakota and lost its appeal in the Eighth 
Circuit. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45059 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 82. Both Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Sheila Bair, 
former Chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), voiced these 
concerns. See Evan Weinberger, Bernanke Questions Small Bank Swipe Fee Exemption, 
Law360 (Feb. 17, 2011), https://www.law360.com/articles/225275/bernanke-questions-
small-bank-swipe-fee-exemption (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Elec. 
Payments Coal., On the Eve of Implementation, Fed Chairman Bernanke and FDIC 
Chairman Bair Still “Concerned” that Debit Card Rule Exemption for Small Financial 
Institutions Won’t Work, PR Newswire (May 12, 2011), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/on-the-eve-of-implementation-fed-chairman-bernanke-and-fdic-chairman-bair-still-
concerned-that-debit-card-rule-exemption-for-small-financial-institutions-wont-work-
121734093.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In response, an amendment was 
offered to delay the implementation of Durbin until an FDIC study ascertaining its impact 
on community banks was completed. This bill failed by only six votes. Alexander Bolton, 
Senate Rejects Delay of Debit-Fee Regulations, Ending K Street Battle (June 9, 2011), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/165411-senate-rejects-delay-of-debit-card-
regulations-ending-biggest-k-street-battle-of-2011 [https://perma.cc/3VYM-2KWX]. 
 83. NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1170 (2015). 
 84. Id. 
 85. The primary empirical results on the Durbin Amendment were developed in 
joint work with Vladimir Mukharlyamov. See Vladimir Mukharlyamov & Natasha Sarin, 
Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets: Empirical Evidence from Debit Cards (July 2019) 
(unpublished working paper) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 
Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation]. 
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Durbin (Figure 4). I am also able to observe how credit and debit usage 
changes in response to Durbin with data from the annual Nielsen Report 
(Figure 5). 
a. Bank impact. — Interchange income dropped instantaneously after 
Durbin. As Figure 1 shows, the decrease is concentrated in banks above 
the $10 billion threshold, suggesting that large issuers bore the brunt of 
Durbin, as intended. Losses for banks above the Durbin threshold total 
approximately $6.5 billion per year, a 25% decrease in interchange 
revenue.86 
FIGURE 1: INTERCHANGE FEES87 
Decreasing banks’ interchange revenue was, of course, Durbin’s 
purpose. However, banks warned that they would be forced to recover 
lost revenue by increasing other consumer fees.88 Not surprisingly, many 
large banks (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Suntrust, and Regions 
Financial) initially proposed a fee on debit purchases to recoup Durbin 
losses: $5 every month consumers used their debit cards as a means of 
purchase. This fee was abandoned due to consumer outrage. A bank con-
                                                                                                                           
 86. This estimate understates bank losses because banks report interchange revenue 
only if it constitutes more than 3% of noninterest income. Ten percent of banks above the 
Durbin threshold that reported interchange income in Q3 2011 no longer reported it in 
Q4 2011. See id. at 11–13. 
 87. This chart was prepared to illustrate pre- and post-Durbin trends in interchange 
fees for the banks above the $10 billion asset threshold relative to banks below the 
threshold. The dataset relied on is the bank regulatory “Call Reports” that are filed 
quarterly by financial institutions. See id. (explaining the dataset in question). 
 88. Comments to the Federal Reserve’s proposed rulemaking contain several such 
cautions by banks. See, e.g., Kaufmann, supra note 11; see also Hurd, supra note 10. 
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sultant suggested that the result would be a less conspicuous increase in 
fees: Banks “are going to have to hide the fees and the customers will still 
have to pay for them.”89 
In practice, this is exactly what happened. Figures 2 and 3 below 
show the impact of Durbin on free checking and monthly fees associated 
with bank checking accounts. Post-Durbin, the availability of free check-
ing accounts decreased by more than 40 percentage points for covered 
issuers: Said another way, in the pre-Durbin period, nearly 60% of large 
banks offered free checking; post-Durbin, this share fell to below 20%. In 
contrast, checking account fees more than doubled, from less than $4 to 
more than $7, for Durbin banks. Significantly, these increases are not re-
lated to general trends in banking—there is neither an equivalent de-
crease in free checking nor an increase in maintenance fees for banks 
below the Durbin threshold. In fact, banks recovered much of their lost 
interchange revenue by increasing consumer fees.90 
The increase in fees is borne primarily by low-income customers 
because monthly maintenance fees are waived for customers above a cer-
tain minimum threshold in their checking accounts.91 One unintended 
consequence of Durbin is that higher fees priced some consumers out of 
the market and resulted in their using more expensive banking replace-
ments such as check-cashing and payday-lending facilities.92 In the most 
                                                                                                                           
 89. Tara Siegel Bernard, In Retreat, Bank of America Cancels Debit Card Fees, N.Y. 
Times (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/business/bank-of-america-
drops-plan-for-debit-card-fee.html [https://perma.cc/NWP5-MY54]. 
 90. See Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 24, 36 (“Overall, 
banks recover around 40% of their losses from Durbin through higher account fees.”). 
These estimates are directionally consistent with another empirical study that considers 
bank responses to the Durbin Amendment. See Benjamin S. Kay, Mark D. Manuszak & 
Cindy M. Vojtech, Bank Profitability and Debit Card Interchange Regulation: Bank 
Responses to the Durbin Amendment (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Fin. & 
Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No. 77, 2014). 
 91. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne & Julian Morris, Unreasonable and 
Disproportionate: How the Durbin Amendment Harms Poorer Americans and Small 
Businesses 11–12 (2017), http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/icle-durbin_update_ 
2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LTD-QD7K]. Pre-Durbin, the minimum deposit thresh-
old averaged $110, but Durbin banks raised this by over 550%, to $720. See id. Usually, 
maintenance fees are levied if a customer does not maintain a minimum balance in their 
account. See generally Justin Song, Checking Account Fees: How Much Are They and How 
Can They Be Waived?, Value Penguin, https://www.valuepenguin.com/banking/checking-
account-fees [https://perma.cc/W853-2GHW] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (detailing the 
minimum deposits and fees of various checking account options). 
 92. Vitaly Bord provides suggestive evidence for this result, albeit in a different 
setting. He finds that an increase in bank fees (stemming from mergers) leads to closures 
of consumer checking accounts and a greater use of payday lending. Vitaly M. Bord, Bank 
Consolidation and Financial Inclusion: The Adverse Effects of Bank Mergers on 
Depositors 3, 47 (Dec. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu 
/files/vbord/files/vbord_-_bank_consolidation_and_financial_inclusion_full.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/CWD4-LXRX]. The biannual FDIC Survey of the Unbanked provides additional 
evidence: The share of survey respondents who ascribe their lack of a bank account to 
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recent FDIC Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, almost 
30% of respondents who previously had a bank account reported that 
they became unbanked because account fees were too high and 
unpredictable.93 
FIGURE 2: FREE CHECKING OFFERED (%), DURBIN VS. NON-DURBIN BANKS94 
                                                                                                                           
high account fees more than doubled between 2011 and 2013, from 5.4% to 13.4%. See 
FDIC, 2013 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households: Executive 
Summary 6 fig.ES3 (2014), https://economicinclusion.gov/surveys/2013household/ documents 
/2013_FDIC_Unbanked_Underbanked_HH_Survey_ExecSumm.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9JQG-88NM]; FDIC, 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked 
Households 69 (2012), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2012_unbankedreport 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SHB-5FFK]. 
 93. FDIC, 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households: 
Appendix Tables 29 (2018), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017appendix.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SC3D-JN6L] [hereinafter FDIC, Survey of Unbanked and Under-
banked Households]. This growth in the unbanked and underbanked population has 
drawn attention and necessitates further study. A recent documentary, Spent, chronicles 
the difficulties faced by nearly 70 million American families without access to the 
traditional financial sector. Spent: Looking for Change (The Young Turks 2014); see also 
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J. on Reg. 121, 177–84 (2004) (discussing 
barriers to banking for low-income families). 
 94. This chart was prepared to illustrate pre- and post-Durbin trends in free checking 
for banks above the $10 billion asset threshold relative to banks below the threshold. The 
dataset relied on is RateWatch, which surveys banks weekly to learn their fee-setting 
practices. See About Us, RateWatch, https://www.rate-watch.com/about-us [https:// 
perma.cc/H3TN-WG4V] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019). Free checking is defined as a 
checking account with a $0 monthly maintenance fee, regardless of the size of the 
account. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 13–14; see also Claes 
Bell, Smart Banking: ‘Free’ Checking Not Always Free, Bankrate (Jan. 20, 2015), 
https://www.bankrate.com/banking/checking/smart-banking-free-checking-not-always-free/ 
[https://perma.cc/47UD-VMMR] (noting that the definition of a “free checking” account 
varies from bank to bank). 
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FIGURE 3: MONTHLY MAINTENANCE FEE ($), DURBIN VS. NON-DURBIN 
BANKS95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Merchant Impact. — Advocates of Durbin asserted that it would 
“enable small businesses and merchants to lower their costs and provide 
discounts for their customers.”96 As a result of Durbin, merchant inter-
change fees decreased by $6.5 billion annually. 97  In a perfectly 
competitive world, these merchant savings would be passed through to 
consumers in the form of lower prices. However, many were skeptical 
that consumers would see any benefit: Former Senator Mark Pryor 
suggested that “the consumer probably ends up paying for [the 
interchange regulation] . . . . They’ll get you. You’re going to pay for it 
one way or another.”98 
                                                                                                                           
 95. This chart was prepared to illustrate pre- and post-Durbin trends in monthly 
maintenance fees for banks above the $10 billion asset threshold relative to banks below 
the threshold. The dataset relied on is RateWatch, which surveys banks weekly to learn 
their fee-setting practices. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 96. Press Release, Senator Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority Leader, U.S. 
Senate, Durbin Sends Letter to Wall Street Reform Conferees on Interchange Amendment 
(May 25, 2010) (quoting Letter from Senator Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority 
Leader, U.S. Senate, to Senator Chris Dodd, Chairman of U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urban Affairs & Senator Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Fin. Servs. 
Comm. (May 25, 2010)), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin -
sends-letter-to-wall-street-reform-conferees-on-interchange-amendment [https://perma.cc/ 
HKT3-7E5M]. 
 97. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 17. 
 98. Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, Swiped: Banks, Merchants and Why Washington 
Doesn’t Work for You, HuffPost (Apr. 28, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/28/swipe-fees-interchange-banks-merchants_n 
_853574.html [https://perma.cc/AN23-9UAH]. 
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Senator Pryor may have been correct: Large retailers reported 
Durbin was a boon to profitability. For example, The Home Depot 
anticipated a gain of $35 million per year from Durbin.99 These results 
are consistent with prior work by Professor David Evans who, with a dif-
ferent event study approach, estimated that over time consumers would 
lose between $22 and $25 billion from Durbin.100 
Survey evidence suggests that retailers failed to fully pass through 
savings: When surveyed, the sectors that experienced the greatest cost re-
duction report that they did not decrease prices in response to Durbin.101 
The gas station serves as a useful measure to estimate the extent to 
which Durbin lowers retail prices. This is for three reasons. First, gas is an 
industry where interchange expense declines substantially post-Durbin: 
15% of total savings accrue to gas retailers.102 Second, gas prices are set 
locally, making it easier to identify a precise Durbin effect.103 Third, gas 
products are standardized, allowing for identification of relatively small 
price movements.104 If gas stations fully passed through Durbin savings, 
then prices would be expected to fall between $0.23 and $0.17 per gallon 
for the average gas station.105 
                                                                                                                           
 99. Carol Tomé, Exec. Vice President of Corp. Servs. & Chief Fin. Officer, The Home Depot, 
Inc., Remarks at the Q4 2010 The Home Depot, Inc. Earnings Conference Call (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9ODMwMTB8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMX 
xUeXBlPTM=&t=1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 100. David S. Evans, Howard H. Chang & Steven Joyce, The Impact of the U.S. Debit 
Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event Study Analysis 6 (Univ. 
of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 658, 2013) (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 101. See Zhu Wang, Scarlett Schwartz & Neil Mitchell, The Impact of the Durbin 
Amendment on Merchants: A Survey Study, 100 Fed. Res. Bank of Rich. Econ. Q. 183, 202, 
207 (2014). The authors surveyed 420 merchants across twenty-six sectors and found that 
only four sectors were likely to have decreased prices in response to Durbin (art, 
automobiles, sporting goods, and other) and that prices fell for just 1.2% of merchants 
overall. Id. at 187, 194. 
 102. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 6. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 30. 
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Figure 4 divides zip codes into ten deciles that range from areas 
most exposed to Durbin (tenth decile) to least exposed (first decile). Zip 
codes are sorted using interchange data that allow observation of how 
Durbin impacts different stations—specifically, some gas stations see few 
debit cards (low Durbin exposure), and others see primarily debit cards 
and have customers that only bank with large banks covered by Durbin 
(high Durbin exposure). If merchants pass through Durbin savings, 
prices should fall across all groups, with the largest price decreases for 
the most-impacted zip codes (tenth decile). Each bar plots the Durbin-
induced gas price change in the six months following Durbin’s 
enactment.106 
FIGURE 4: DURBIN’S IMPACT ON GAS PRICES BY DECILE107 
 
                                                                                                                           
 106. Specifically, point estimates from the following regression are plotted, along with 
the 95% confidence interval: Margın − Margın = β	 × Impact + ϵ. In each regression, 
“Impact” takes a value of 1 for the relevant decile and a value of 0 for the bottom decile. 
These are estimates of how gas station margins (price net of wholesale cost) change based 
on a zip code’s exposure to Durbin and controlling for regional and gas station level 
differences. In each case, the control group is zip codes in the bottom decile, where 
Durbin does not impact merchants’ interchange costs. Coefficients are plotted in dollars—
for example, for the tenth decile, the estimate is a price decrease of approximately $0.03. 
Further detail is provided id. at 30–34. 
 107. This chart was prepared to illustrate the impact of Durbin on prices set by gas 
retailers. For each decile of Durbin impact, this chart compares merchants whose 
interchange expense falls post-Durbin to a matched control group of gas retailers who are 
not similarly impacted. Data on Durbin impact are proprietary and made available by a 
leading payments industry player, subject to robust privacy and data protection controls. 
Data on gas station margins come from the Oil Price Information Service, which monitors 
retail gas prices. 
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While there is evidence of a statistically significant price reduction 
following Durbin for gas retailers in the top deciles, overall, there is 
limited pass-through of Durbin savings.108 Gas retailers pass through only 
a quarter of the $1 billion in interchange savings that accrue annually.109 
Debit interchange regulation is thus a $770 million annual boon to gas 
retailers’ profitability.110 Extrapolating this estimate from the gas industry 
more broadly, the analysis suggests that around 75% of the $6.5 billion in 
annual Durbin savings went directly to retailers’ bottom line.111 Durbin 
decreases consumer welfare by at least $1 billion annually.112 
This estimate likely understates Durbin’s impact, because the new 
debit interchange cap did not help all retailers. Small-ticket merchants 
without sufficient market power to negotiate with card networks saw their 
interchange rates rise, not fall, as the Board’s debit interchange cap 
became a floor.113 These merchants raised prices.114 For example, Redbox, 
which provides movie rentals through vending machines, increased 
prices by 20% post-Durbin,115 while Parkmobile, a smartphone applica-
tion that helps Washington, D.C. residents pay for parking, raised its fees 
by more than 40%.116 Small business owners decried Durbin’s impact. An 
                                                                                                                           
 108. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 31. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 26–31 (providing more detail on estimates of gas stations’ pass-through of 
Durbin savings). 
 111. Id. at 6–7. There may be differences in pass-through across industries. See supra 
note 30 and accompanying text. 
 112. One way to understand the Durbin Amendment is as a wealth transfer from banks 
to businesses. One large retailer suggests that, despite the lack of discernible price 
changes, consumers are in fact the ultimate beneficiaries. Telephone Interview with 
Anonymous Representative (June 2017). The retailer was able to improve its customer 
service because of declining interchange expense. Id. This is certainly plausible, but does 
not seem to fit with the consumer savings that Senator Durbin claimed regulation would 
bring about. Retailers’ shareholders certainly benefit as consumers, but this benefit is 
subsidized by higher checking account prices for low-income consumers. See supra text 
accompanying notes 86–93. 
 113. See Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 16. 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 15. 
 115. Daniel Indiviglio, Angry that Redbox Is Hiking DVD Rental Prices? Blame 
Congress, Atlantic (Oct. 28, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/ 
10/angry-that-redbox-is-hiking-dvd-rental-prices-blame-congress/247535/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2UWS=GU2S]. 
 116. See Dina ElBoghadady, Parkmobile Fee Increase Causes Scuffle with Sen. Durbin, 
Wash. Post (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/parkmobile -
fee-increase-causes-scuffle-with-sen-durbinparkmobile-fee-hike-causes-scuffle-with-senator/ 
2012/11/02/86c2a63c-2511-11e2-9313-3c7f59038d93_story.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). It was in fact Visa and Mastercard’s reaction to the Durbin Amendment, not 
the legislation itself, which resulted in higher costs for Parkmobile. See Robin Sidel, Debit-
Fee Cap Has Nasty Side Effect, Wall St. J. (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052970204319004577084613307585768 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(reporting on the decisions of retailers to raise prices in response to higher rates from 
debit card companies). Parkmobile eventually had to apologize when Senator Durbin 
wrote a letter calling their claim “grossly misleading.” Id. 
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owner of New York coffee houses said that in response to the new debit 
fee cap: “My choice is to raise prices, discount for cash or get an ATM.”117 
Another merchant said that when customers offer a card to buy a low-
dollar item, like a banana, he gives it to them for free to forego the 
interchange expense: “Just take the banana. Don’t give me the card.”118 
The vending machine industry was especially hurt by Durbin—its 
interchange fees increased by more than 200%.119 Visa struck agreements 
with some vending machine payment processors;120 however, Mastercard 
refused to negotiate a lower rate, leading many vending machines to 
drop Mastercard debit from their list of accepted payment methods121 
until a similar deal was eventually reached years later.122 
4. Unintended Consequences of Intervention. — Durbin was not the first 
legislative attempt to rein in interchange fees. Interestingly, earlier itera-
tions focused on credit rather than debit fees.123 This was because credit 
interchange rates were historically higher,124 and legislators hoped to 
dissuade banks and card networks from encouraging consumers to over-
use credit cards, which can lead to expensive cycles of indebtedness. 
The latter was exactly the rationale for the Reserve Bank of 
Australia’s (RBA) 2003 decision to intervene in this market by capping 
credit interchange fees at 0.55% of total transaction value.125 The RBA’s 
primary objective “was to change the relative prices of credit cards and 
                                                                                                                           
 117. Sidel, supra note 116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Think Coffee 
owner Jason Scherr). 
 118. Carter & Grim, supra note 98 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cups 
& Co. owner Charlie Chung). 
 119. Sidel, supra note 116. 
 120. Dig. Transactions News Staff, Apriva Extends Agreement with Visa to Offer 
Discounted Vending-Machine Pricing, Dig. Transactions (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www. 
digitaltransactions.net/apriva-extends-agreement-with-visa-to-offer-discounted-vending-machine 
-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/JD6Z-7TAX]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. In January 2015, after a hiatus of more than three years, vending machines that 
get payment services through USA Technologies began accepting Mastercard debit again. 
Mastercard Int’l Inc. & USA Techs., Acceptance Agreement (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/896429/000157104915004372/t82294_ex10-2.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/PB34-9YKB]. 
 123. See, e.g., Credit Card Fair Fee Act, H.R. 5546, 110th Cong. (2008); Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, S. 3252, 110th Cong. (2008); Credit Card 
Interchange Fees Act, H.R. 6248, 110th Cong. (2008); Credit Card Fair Fee Act, S. 3086, 
110th Cong. (2008) (sponsored by Sen. Durbin). 
 124. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 69, at 19. 
 125. See Background, Reserve Bank of Austl., https://www.rba.gov.au/payments-and-
infrastructure/credit-cards/cc-fees-benchmark/background.html [https://perma.cc/4NZX- 
SUCC] (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) (“The effect of the standards has been to reduce the 
average interchange fee from around 0.95 per cent of the credit card transaction value to 
a little below 0.55 per cent.”). 
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debit cards to cardholders . . . reducing the substantial incentive to use 
credit cards over debit cards.”126 
Despite the fact that the Australian case study was well known to 
policymakers during the Durbin debate,127 the legislation eventually tar-
geted debit interchange. This was in response to a substantial lobbying 
effort by banks and credit card networks, which warned that any re-
striction on credit interchange would lead issuers to “squeeze credit and 
raise the cost of credit cards at a time when the economy thirsts for credit 
to sustain an economic recovery.”128 In fact, Durbin lauded the Amend-
ment’s focus on debit interchange, noting that, as a result, it would avoid 
any undesirable credit supply impact.129 
However, in capping debit interchange rates, the Durbin Amendment 
perversely increased the use of credit relative to its cheaper debit 
counterpart. Debit is also a preferred means of transacting in the eyes of 
many because it decouples financial transacting from consumer borrow-
ing, thereby reducing the likelihood that purchases will land consumers 
in expensive cycles of debt.130 David Evans, an academic with extensive 
background in payment systems, commented on the irony of Durbin 
targeting debit, rather than credit: 
Debit cards . . . are the responsible man’s plastic. You are only 
using the money you have, it comes right out of your checking 
account, so if you’re concerned about consumer debt, you want 
people to be using debit cards more. . . . [I]t makes no sense for 
the Dodd–Frank Act to include an amendment that’s going to 
                                                                                                                           
 126. Michele Bullock, A Guide to the Card Payments System Reforms, Res. Bank Austl. 
Bull., Sept. 2010, at 51, 59. 
 127. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees: 
Implications and Consequences of the Durbin Amendment: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 
12 (2011) (statement of Hon. Raskin) (“The Reserve Bank of Australia actually regulates 
credit card interchange on a cost basis. . . . We are obviously looking just at debit card 
interchange.”). 
 128. Keith Bradsher, U.S. Looks to Australia on Credit Card Fees, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/25card.html 
[https://perma.cc/U8V6-X3AB]. The implications of a potential credit squeeze were 
especially worrying for minority groups, who historically have less credit access than their 
white counterparts. Christian E. Weller, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Access Denied: Low-Income 
and Minority Families Face More Credit Constraints and Higher Borrowing Costs 1 
(2007), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/08/pdf/ 
credit_access.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA6K-YJXY] (“[Minority] families are still denied 
credit more often than white families with the same income, and low-income families are 
more often denied access to credit than middle-income and higher-income families—even 
when low-income families apply for credit in line with their income and creditworthiness.”). 
 129. See Durbin, Statement on Swipe Fee Amendment, supra note 8. 
 130. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1421 (2004) 
(“[T]he distorted pricing pattern observed in the credit card market is the product of the 
underestimation bias on the one hand and the bundling of transacting and borrowing on 
the other hand. . . . [T]he market has taken the first step towards the unbundling . . . with 
the invent of the debit card.”). 
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make debit cards less available for consumers, and it’s going to 
have the unavoidable consequences to push them towards 
credit. I think it’s nuts.131 
In response to Durbin, banks encouraged greater credit usage.132 For 
example, spending on credit card rewards among big issuers more than 
doubled since 2010133 while debit rewards programs were largely elimi-
nated.134 Not surprisingly, as a result credit usage grew more in the three 
years following Durbin’s enactment than in any other three-year period 
since 2000.135 For megabanks, this growth was especially pronounced: 
Credit usage by Wells Fargo customers increased by around 20% annually 
in the years following Durbin, but debit growth rates fell to 2% annu-
ally. 136  For JP Morgan, credit usage grew by around 10% annually 
following Durbin, but debit growth rates fell to only 4% a year.137 Figure 5 
plots the average credit and debit growth rates for the five largest finan-
cial institutions, which together account for more than 60% of total U.S. 
deposits. Although debit growth falls significantly following Durbin, 
credit growth increases substantially, which is at least suggestive of banks 
encouraging consumers to turn more frequently to credit cards, whose 
interchange rates are left uncapped by Durbin. Visa’s CEO Joe Saunders 
highlighted this trend and noted that it is “what one would expect” from 
legislation capping debit, but not credit, interchange rates.138 
 
                                                                                                                           
 131. Martin Neal Baily: Reasonable Regulation of Debit Card 
Fees (Transcript), PYMNTS (May 2, 2011), https://www.pymnts.com/news/2011/martin-
neal-baily-reasonable-regulation-of-debit-card-fees-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/BT9S-BAAD]. 
 132. As an example, in September 2011, Chase distributed a brochure to explain that 
credit is a superior payment instrument to debit for all purchases. Arin H. Smith, Note, 
Durbin’s Defect: The Impact of Post-Recession Legislation on Low-Income Consumers, 89 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 363, 376 (2014). 
 133. Credit Card Rewards More than Doubled Since the Recession, New Study 
Shows, Magnify Money Blog (May 4, 2017), http://www.magnifymoney.com/blog/news/ 
credit-card-issuers-doubled-spending-rewards840948580/ [https://perma.cc/4KDX-F55F]. 
 134. Richard Kerr, Where Have All the Rewards Debit Cards Gone?, The Points 
Guy (June 24, 2015), https://thepointsguy.com/2015/06/rewards-debit-cards-gone/ 
[https://perma.cc/4U5C-8FVS]. 
 135. See Fed. Reserve Sys., The Federal Reserve Payments Study 2016 at 4 (2016), 
https:// www.federalreserve.gov/ newsevents/ press/ other/ 2016-payments-study-
20161222.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XKE-8GMG]. 
 136. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Street Events Edited Transcript: V-Q1 2012 
Visa Inc. Earnings Conference Call 12 (2012), https://s1.q4cdn.com/050606653/files/ 
doc_financials/transcript/2012/V-Transcript-2012-Q1-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDG7-
N7P7]. 
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FIGURE 5: CREDIT AND DEBIT GROWTH RATE FOR LARGEST BANKS139 
B.  The CARD Act 
1. The Policy Problem. — In 1980, credit card contracts were a page 
long. Today, the average contract is more than thirty pages. Professor and 
now-Senator Warren called this a move toward the inclusion of “tricks 
and traps that would obscure the true cost of credit—and drive profits 
through the roof.”140 To some extent, she was correct. 
Card fees have exploded since the late 1990s. This growth is tied to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.141 
The case related to the interpretation of the National Bank Act, which 
allows banks to charge interest rates based on the state in which the bank 
resides.142 In Smiley, Citibank levied penalty fees against a customer 
(Smiley) that were legal in the state of its headquarters (South Dakota) 
but not where Smiley resided (California).143 Shortly after the initial com-
plaint, the Office of the Comptroller promulgated a rule explicitly 
including late fees within the context of the National Bank Act,144 and in 
                                                                                                                           
 139. Calculations for this Figure are from the Nilson Report, which reports debit and 
credit usage for large issuers annually. 
 140. Sarlin, supra note 40. 
 141. 517 U.S. 735, 747 (1996). 
 142. Id. at 737. 
 143. Id. at 737–38. 
 144. Id. at 739–40. 
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Smiley, the Supreme Court ruled that this interpretation was not 
unreasonable.145 
Consumer penalty fees more than doubled in the immediate 
aftermath of Smiley, from just over $8 billion in 1995 to nearly $19 billion 
in 1998.146 By 2004, penalty fees accounted for more than half of the 
credit card fees U.S. cardholders paid in 2004 (12.5% of issuers’ 
revenues).147 Various credit card contract terms enabled issuers to extract 
maximum fees. For example, card companies did not have to provide 
notice of interest rate increases; they could raise them without warning 
when cardholders applied for a mortgage or made a large purchase that 
lowered their credit score.148 And although introductory teaser rates are 
presented to consumers up front, myriad other fees—such as late fees, 
over-limit fees, bounced-check fees, convenience and service fees, fees 
for statement copies and replacement cards, foreign-currency conversion 
fees, phone-payment convenience fees, wire-transfer fees, and balance-
transfer fees—are buried deep in increasingly complex contracts.149 Con-
sumer inattention to these nonsalient back-end terms precipitated a 
status quo whereby consumers unknowingly incurred avoidable 
expenses.150 And there was no incentive for new firms to offer more 
transparent products—that is, making clear up front what the cost of 
credit will be for consumers—because such honest brokers would have 
no customers: Many consumers opted for products with a low up-front 
price (0% APR for 18 months) and high penalty fees, even though they 
                                                                                                                           
 145. Id. at 747. 
 146. Tamara Draut & Javier Silva, Dēmos, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth 
of Credit Card Debt in the ‘90s, at 35 (2003), https://www.demos.org/sites/default 
/files/publications/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y84-5YBX] 
(highlighting how Smiley drastically increased credit card penalty fees). 
 147. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 47; see also Nadia Massoud, Anthony 
Saunders & Barry Scholnick, The Cost of Being Late? The Case of Credit Card Penalty 
Fees, 7 J. Fin. Stability 49, 50–51 (2011). 
 148. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 48 & n.132 (describing issuers’ practice 
of “doubl[ing] or tripl[ing] interest rates when a cardholder’s credit score drops”). 
 149. Professors Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson discuss the tendency of firms to 
shroud information from less sophisticated customers. One example they provide is bank 
accounts: 
For example, banks prominently advertise the virtues of their accounts, 
but the marketing materials do not highlight the costs of an account 
which include ATM usage fees, bounced check fees, minimum balance 
fees, etc. Banks could compete on these costs, but they instead choose to 
shroud them. Indeed, many bank customers do not learn the details of 
the fee stricture until long after they have opened their accounts.  
Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 505, 506 (2006). 
 150. See Gregory Bresiger, People Are Unaware of How Much They Spend on Bank 
Fees, N.Y. Post (July 16, 2016), https://nypost.com/2016/07/16/people-are-unaware-of-
how-much-they-spend-on-bank-fees/ [https://perma.cc/9ADB-WG5P] (“The main reason 
for the sky-high fees is that the customer is unaware of them.”). 
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would end up paying more in the long run in late fees and higher 
interest rates if they were delinquent.151 Loss-leader pricing to exploit 
consumers’ irrationality was responsible for substantial credit card 
revenues in the precrisis period.152 
2. Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. — In response to 
widespread outrage, interventions in this market began during the Reces-
sion. In May 2007, the Federal Reserve proposed revisions to the Truth in 
Lending Act, and in February 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke testified before Congress that the Federal Reserve planned to 
use its authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive credit card practices.153 In 
May 2008, the Fed proposed rules focused on protecting customers from 
unexpected increases in interest rates or penalty fees, ending two-cycle 
billing,154 and prohibiting card issuers from creating a “cycle of debt” for 
subprime borrowers by opening accounts likely to generate astronomical 
fee revenue.155 
In tandem, Congress focused on this market. Carolyn Maloney (New 
York Democrat) introduced the “Credit Cardholder’s Bill of Rights,” 
which passed the House in September 2008 but was never considered in 
the Senate.156 The bill was reintroduced in January 2009, only one month 
after the Federal Reserve issued its final rules to regulate card company 
practices.157 In April and May 2009, both the House and the Senate 
overwhelmingly passed (357-70 and 90-5 votes, respectively 158 ) the 
                                                                                                                           
 151. See Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu & Nicholas S. 
Souleles, Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?, 4 Rev. Corp. Fin. Stud. 239, 
242 (2015) (“A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) . . . chose the suboptimal 
contract, with a few non-fee-paying consumers incurring hundreds of dollars of readily 
avoidable interest charges.”). 
 152. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the Credit Market 20–22 (June 
17, 1999) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that 
consumers are overly sensitive to promotional teaser rates and hypothesizing that this is 
because they underestimate the probability that they will later still be borrowing at higher, 
post-teaser rates and fail to optimize with these post-teaser prices in mind). 
 153. Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 4 (providing a detailed discussion of the 
CARD Act’s staged legislative history). 
 154. That is, when a consumer pays the entire balance one month but fails to do so 
the following month, and the bank calculates interest for the second month using days in 
the previous cycle as well as the current cycle. 
 155. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Highlights of Final Rules 
Regarding Credit Card Accounts (Dec. 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents 
/pressreleases/files/bcreg20081218a1.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9DQ-7MX5] (proposing rules 
to “prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices by banks in connection with credit card 
accounts”). 
 156. Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, The Credit Cardholder’s Bill of Rights (Feb. 6, 
2008), https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/credit-cardholders%E2%80%99- 
bill-rights-balanced-reform [https://perma.cc/2ACJ-3KJ2]. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 155 Cong. Rec. 12,833 (2009) (Senate vote); 155 Cong. Rec. 11,204 (2009) 
(House vote). 
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reintroduced bill—the CARD Act.159 The CARD Act superseded the 
Federal Reserve’s rules.160 The CARD Act adopted many of the same 
prohibitions as the Federal Reserve (such as limiting unexpected interest 
rate hikes161) and added terms to reduce credit availability for college 
students,162 which regulators hoped would decrease the likelihood that 
young borrowers would find themselves stuck in cycles of debt.163 The 
CARD Act’s ban on certain contract terms was meant to address the sali-
ence problem in this market: Consumers, enticed by attractive offers of 
0% initial interest rates, unknowingly paid high back-end fees (such as 
penalty fees, interest rate increases, and over-limit fees).164 By decreasing 
card networks’ ability to generate revenue from some of these hidden 
levers, CARD Act advocates hoped to decrease the overall cost of credit 
for consumers or at the very least make sure that consumers appreciated 
the true cost of credit. 
3. Impact of Regulatory Intervention. — The CARD Act changed the 
economics of the credit card business by turning a short-term revolving 
unsecured loan, which could reprice when signals of consumer riskiness 
materialized, into a longer-term unsecured loan with lower ability to 
price discriminate by risk type. Opponents of the CARD Act warned that 
the result would be higher interest rates for consumers across the board 
and a decrease in credit supply.165 Empirical evidence (detailed below) 
                                                                                                                           
 159. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 
123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). 
 160. Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 1. 
 161. § 101, 123 Stat. at 1735–36 (requiring advance notice of increase in interest rate). 
 162. § 301, 123 Stat. at 1747–48 (prohibiting extensions of credit to underage 
consumers). 
 163. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 34 (discussing Haiyan Shui and 
Lawrence Ausubel’s findings that consumers routinely pay more interest than they must). 
This Article focuses on the aspects of the CARD Act that regulated issuers’ back-end credit 
card contract terms rather than other features such as the requirement that issuers assess 
borrowers’ ability to repay before providing credit. These features also had unintended 
consequences: Until the CARD Act was amended, for example, one group of borrowers 
who found their access to credit restricted was spouses or partners who do not work 
outside the home. See The CFPB Amends Card Act Rule to Make It Easier for Stay-at-
Home Spouses and Partners to Get Credit Cards, CFPB (Apr. 29, 2013), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/the-cfpb-amends-card-act-rule-to-
make-it-easier-for-stay-at-home-spouses-and-partners-to-get-credit-cards/ (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 164. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 18, at 33–37, 46–52 (discussing the poorly 
informed behavior of consumers of credit cards and the changes that credit card issuers 
have developed over time to exploit this consumer behavior). 
 165. See Connelly, supra note 13; see also Tse, supra note 42. The CARD Act 
restrictions, such as the prohibition on rate increases for existing balances and the 
limitations on penalties and over-the-limit fees, severely hamper the ability to manage 
customer risks. Not only does this result in higher rates than would otherwise apply 
without the CARD Act, but those customers who might otherwise pay lower rates are 
subsidizing those who should pay higher rates, and credit availability may be constrained. 
See Letter from Jeffrey P. Bloch, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to Monica 
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illustrates that critics were wrong—the CARD Act increased overall 
consumer welfare. It is important to understand why these concerns were 
overblown. 
Estimates suggest the CARD Act reduced overall credit card fees by 
nearly $25 per account annually, resulting in total cost savings for credit 
card users of nearly $12 billion per year.166 These savings were largest 
(nearly $60 per account per year) for the least-creditworthy borrowers 
(those with a FICO score below 660).167 Overall, these savings represent a 
decrease in account fees of over 25%.168 
Despite early anecdotal evidence to the contrary,169 most academic 
work finds little support for the notion that banks offset the CARD Act’s 
losses through increases in interest rates or other fees.170 There appears 
to be no increase in interest rates in response to the CARD Act, either on 
existing accounts or on new accounts, which are less constrained by the 
CARD Act’s repricing restrictions.171 However, there is some evidence 
that unregulated fees less salient to consumers—such as cash advance 
APRs—increased slightly in response to the CARD Act.172 
                                                                                                                           
Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, CFPB (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.consumerbankers. 
com/sites/default/files/021913_CBA-Response-to-CFPB-RFI-to-Study-the-Effects-of-The-
CARD-Act-on-the-Credit-Card-Market.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4K7-V67L]. 
 166. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 
114. This study provides the most exhaustive empirical work done on the impact of the 
CARD Act to date. The authors use a panel data set covering 160 million credit card 
accounts and adopt a difference-in-difference research design, comparing changes in 
outcomes over time for consumer credit cards, which were subject to the new regulations, 
to small business cards, which were exempted. Id. at 113. 
 167. Id. at 114. Those with a FICO score above 660 experienced a smaller decline in 
fees, of $7.59 per account. Id. 
 168. For accounts with FICO scores below 660, late fees decline by 1.5 percentage 
points over both implementation phases, from a pre–CARD Act mean of 5.9% (1.5/5.9 = 
25.4%). Id. 
 169. Connelly, supra note 13. 
 170. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 
115 (“We find little offsetting response in terms of pricing. Using the same difference-in-
differences approach, we find no difference in anticipatory increase in interest charges 
prior to the CARD Act, and no evidence of a sharp or gradual increase following the 
CARD Act implementation periods.”) One recent exception is the work of economist Scott 
Nelson, which suggests that the CARD Act’s limits on interest-rate adjustment resulted in 
across-the-board higher interest rates on average for all borrowers at origination. See Scott 
T. Nelson, Essays on Household Finance and Credit Market Regulation 23 (June 12, 2018) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). However, he concludes that the reduction in lender rents outweighs 
the impact of higher prices, “so that on net, the Act’s restrictions allow consumers of all 
credit scores to capture higher surplus on average.” Nelson, Private Information, supra 
note 19. 
 171. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 
153–58. 
 172. Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 19, at 997. 
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4. Unintended Consequences of Intervention. — Evidence on the CARD 
Act’s impact on credit supply is less clear, but there is some evidence that 
the Federal Reserve’s 2008 rule proposals, which directly influenced the 
CARD Act’s eventual reforms, triggered a decline in credit availability. But 
given that this earlier proposal coincides with the Recession, it is difficult 
to establish causally that decreased credit supply is attributable to immi-
nent pricing restrictions rather than to the general economic downturn.173 
Recent work suggests that the CARD Act did somewhat decrease 
credit supply for subprime borrowers.174 The existence of a supply-side 
credit effect, especially for subprime borrowers, is consistent with 
industry commentary:175 In its recent assessment of the CARD Act, the 
American Bankers Association (ABA) indicated that the Act decreased 
credit availability for subprime borrowers.176 Specifically, the ABA noted 
that from 2008 to 2016, total credit card accounts for superprime borrow-
ers rose from 151 million to 176 million while total credit card accounts 
for subprime borrowers fell from 89 million to 73 million.177 
Still, on aggregate, this credit-supply effect appears outweighed by a 
decrease in lender rents.178 The overall equilibrium effect of the CARD 
Act is an increase in consumer surplus estimated to be approximately $12 
billion annually.179 This finding is consistent with estimates from the 
CFPB, which argues that the total cost of consumer credit declined by 
two percentage points between 2008 and 2012.180 
                                                                                                                           
 173. Jambulapati & Stavins, supra note 19, at 1 (making clear that it is difficult to 
determine whether the cause of account closures “was the economic downturn or 
preemptive action in anticipation of the new legislation”). 
 174. Nelson, Private Information, supra note 19, at 4. 
 175. See, e.g., Connelly, supra note 13 (“[A] law [the CARD Act] hailed as the most 
sweeping piece of consumer legislation in decades has helped make it more difficult for 
millions of Americans to get credit, and made that credit more expensive.”); see also 
Comment Letter from Nessa Eileen Feddis & Brian Murphy, Am. Bankers Ass’n, to Monica 
Jackson, Office of the Exec. Sec’y, CFPB 2 (June 8, 2017) https://www.aba.com/-
/media/documents/comment-letter/cl-card-act2017june.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN3V-
BTG9] [hereinafter Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Credit Card Market] (“The availability 
of credit has declined, particularly for subprime borrowers who have no, limited, or poor 
credit histories.”). 
 176. See Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Credit Card Market, supra note 175. 
 177. Id. at 3. 
 178. See Nelson, Private Information, supra note 19, at 3. 
 179. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 
111. 
 180. CFPB, CARD Act Report: A Review of the Impact of the CARD Act on the 
Consumer Credit Card Market 5 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309 
_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWP2-ZWMW] (“[T]he total cost of credit . . . 
declined by 194 basis points from Q4 2008 to Q4 2012.”). 
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C.  Overdraft 
1. The Policy Problem. — An overdraft occurs when a customer 
attempts to withdraw an amount from their checking account, either 
through an ATM withdrawal or point-of-sale purchase, that exceeds the 
funds available in their account. Banks earn overdraft revenue by 
allowing customers to complete these transactions for a fee. Historically, 
institutions determined whether to cover overdraft transactions on a 
case-by-case basis based on customer and overdraft characteristics. In the 
early 2000s, banks began transitioning to automated overdraft pro-
grams—often designed by third-party vendors181—to maximize bank 
overdraft revenue by, for example, ordering customer overdrafts from 
largest to smallest, which can increase the frequency of overdrafts, and 
advertising overdraft programs to customers.182 To study the growth in 
overdraft revenue and how it has shifted as a result of recent reform, I 
rely on data from bank regulatory filings. As Figure 6 illustrates, service 
charges on deposit accounts183 increased by more than 90% between 
1999 and 2009. In fact, in 2006, overdraft fees accounted for around 6% 
of banks’ total  net operating revenues.184 
  
                                                                                                                           
 181. See FDIC, FDIC Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, at III, 50 (2008), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/overdraft/fdic138_report_final_v508.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WU93-599G] [hereinafter FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft 
Programs]. 
 182. Id. at III, 36–38. 
 183. Until 2015, banks were not required to report overdraft fees as a line item on 
financial filings. See Peter Smith, Report: FDIC Data Shows that Banks Collected $11.45 
Billion in Overdraft Fees in 2017, Ctr. for Responsible Lending (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.responsiblelending.org/media/report-fdic-data-shows-banks-collected-1145-
billion-overdraft-fees-2017 [https://perma.cc/UY7D-6396] (“Since 2015, the FDIC has 
collected and released information about these harmful penalty fees from banks that have 
$1 billion or more in assets.”). Instead, “Service Charges on Deposit Accounts” includes 
overdraft and other fees, such as monthly maintenance fees on deposit accounts. Fed. Fin. 
Insts. Examination Council, Instructions for Preparation of Consolidated Reports of 
Condition and Income: FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041, at RI-9 (2019), 
https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC031_FFIEC041_201906_i.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UCP7-BY3H] (describing the components of the “Service Charges on 
Deposit Accounts” line item). However, overdraft fees, at least prior to changes to 
Regulation E, were responsible for a sizable fraction of service charges on deposit 
accounts. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at III, 56. 
Specifically, the FDIC estimated that fees related to nonsufficient funds (NSF) were 74% of 
total service charges on deposit accounts reported in 2006. Id. 
 184. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at 56. 
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FIGURE 6: SERVICE CHARGES ON DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS (ANNUAL)185 
Overdraft revenue is generated primarily by repeat overdrafters. 
Before the Recession, about 75% of accounts had no overdraft incidents, 
12% had one to four, 5% had five to nine, 4% had ten to nineteen, and 
only about 5% had more than twenty overdrafts annually.186 Customers 
with more than ten overdraft transactions—fewer than 10% of all 
checking account customers—accrued 84% of the reported overdraft 
and nonsufficient funds (NSF) fees.187 These customers were typically low 
income: In 2006, 38% of low-income customers overdrafted, compared to 
only 22% of their high-income counterparts.188 Low-income customers 
were also about twice as likely to be frequent overdrafters.189 
Overdraft is essentially a very high-interest loan: If paid within two 
weeks, a $27 overdraft fee190 for a $20 overdraft incident is equivalent to a 
bank loan with an APR of 3,520%. Banks offer cheaper ways to complete 
these transactions, for example, by opening an overdraft line of credit 
                                                                                                                           
 185. This chart was prepared to illustrate the impact of changes in the overdraft 
market. The data come from the bank regulatory “Call Reports.” Banks do not report 
overdraft income explicitly; instead, they report service fees on deposit accounts, which 
includes overdraft, but also revenue from monthly maintenance fees, ATM out-of-network 
fees, check-cashing fees, and the like. Fed. Fin. Insts. Examination Council, supra note 
183, at RI-9 to RI-10. 
 186. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at IV. 
 187. CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 18. 
 188. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at V. Notably, in 
some areas, “low-income” customers earned a median annual income of less than $30,000. 
Id. 
 189. Id. (explaining that 7.5% of low-income customers experienced twenty or more 
overdraft incidents in a year, compared to only 3.8% of high-income customers). 
 190. This is the median for the FDIC study. Id. 
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(usually an APR of around 18%) or linking a checking account to a 
savings or credit card account (costing a $5 flat fee).191  Given the 
availability of cheaper alternatives, banks’ ability to generate overdraft 
revenue, especially from repeat overdrafters, is puzzling. One possible 
explanation for overdraft incidence is consumer inattention—nearly all 
consumers who overdraft are unaware that they are about to overdraw 
their accounts and unfamiliar with the magnitude of overdraft 
penalties.192 The lack of salience of these fees to the consumers who bear 
them enables banks to generate large overdraft profits. 
Prior to recent changes, bank customers were automatically opted in 
to overdraft protection. Given the rapid increase in overdraft fees since 
the early 1990s and their disproportionate incidence on low-income 
customers, both popular commentators 193  and regulators 194  voiced 
concern. 
2. Regulatory Approach to Solving the Problem. — In 2005, the Federal 
Reserve amended Regulation DD, which implements the Truth in 
Savings Act, to require additional disclosures about overdraft services and 
rein in misleading advertisements.195 Banks were also required to disclose 
total overdraft fees incurred in periodic account statements.196 Regula-
tors hoped disclosures would nudge customers away from overdraft and 
push them toward cheaper alternatives.197 
Despite this intervention, overdraft fee income for banks and credit 
unions rose 35% from 2006 to 2008. 198  The Board then amended 
                                                                                                                           
 191. Id. at III. 
 192. Pew Ctr. on the States, Overdraft America: Confusion and Concerns About Bank 
Practices 4 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/ 
2012/sciboverdraft20america1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3M8-5SZK]. 
 193. See, e.g., Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, Overspending on Debit Cards Is a Boon 
for Banks, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/your-
money/credit-and-debit-cards/09debit.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). One 
New York Times editorial called for regulators to “move quickly and aggressively to protect 
consumers.” Editorial, Debit Card Trap, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/08/20/opinion/20thu1.html [https://perma.cc/3ZY7-NSNZ]. The edi-
torial offered vivid anecdotes—for example, of a college student who “made seven small 
purchases including coffee and school supplies that totaled $16.55 and was hit with 
overdraft fees that totaled $245.” Id.; see also Editorial, That $35 Cup of Coffee, N.Y. Times 
(Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/opinion/14sat2.html [https://perma.cc 
/NAU3-NKDC]. 
 194. See FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at II–V 
(describing a 2008 FDIC study to gather data on overdraft programs in response to the 
growth in automated overdraft). 
 195. 12 C.F.R. § 230.11(b) (2006). 
 196. Id. § 230.11(a). 
 197. Truth in Savings, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,583 (May 24, 2005) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 230.11) (explaining the Board’s rationale for adopting new regulations). 
 198. Leslie Parrish, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Overdraft Explosion: Bank Fees for 
Overdrafts Increase 35% in Two Years 5 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
overdraft-loans/research-analysis/crl-overdraft-explosion.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW97-2B8Q]. 
2019] MAKING CONSUMER FINANCE WORK 1555 
 
Regulation E to change the default rules for overdraft.199 In January 
2009, it requested comment on two policy defaults: (1) an opt-out 
default, which would prohibit banks from assessing overdraft fees unless 
customers were given notice and a reasonable opportunity to opt out of 
overdraft protection and chose not to; and (2) an opt-in default, which 
would prohibit banks from assessing overdraft fees unless customers 
affirmatively opted in.200 
The final rule adopted an opt-in approach.201 In selecting this policy 
default, the Board specifically pointed to the fact that consumers 
unwittingly bear these fees. The Board hoped to avoid situations going 
forward where consumers “may unintentionally overdraw their account 
based on the erroneous belief that a transaction would be paid only if the 
consumer has sufficient funds in the account to cover it.”202 Because 
consumers are likely to adhere to established defaults,203 the Board 
believed the opt-in regime would help prevent expensive and frequent 
overdraft incidents.204 
The new default rule, which prohibits levying overdraft fees unless 
consumers actively opt in to overdraft protection, was meant to be a 
strong nudge against overdraft protection: The Board concluded that 
consumers would prefer such transactions be declined and amended the 
default rule accordingly.205 This view is consistent with the Board’s own 
internal testing206 and surveys,207 which demonstrate that about half of 
                                                                                                                           
 199. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2010). 
 200. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 5212, 5215 (proposed Jan. 29, 2009) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 205.17). 
 201. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17. Changes to Regulation E involve only ATM and point-of-sale 
overdrafts. Overdrafts for check or scheduled recurring payments are not subject to the 
new opt-in requirement. Id. § 205.17(b)(2). 
 202. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,033, 59,039 (Nov. 17, 2009) (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. § 205.17).  
 203. As support for this proposition, the Federal Reserve Board cited Brigitte C. 
Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and 
Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. Econ. 1149 (2001); and Gabriel D. Carroll, James J. Choi, David 
Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 
124 Q.J. Econ. 1639 (2009). Both studies examine automatic enrollment in 401(k) savings 
plans and find a significant increase in employee participation when the default rule is 
enrollment rather than a default that requires employees agree to participation. See 
Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,038 n.25. 
 204. But see Todd Zywicki, Behavioral Law and Economics and Bank Overdraft 
Protection, Volokh Conspiracy (Nov. 20, 2013), http://volokh.com/2013/11/20/behavioral 
-law-economics-bank-overdraft-protection/ [https://perma.cc/3U3D-PBSY] (“[T]he propensity 
to opt-in is positively correlated with the number of overdrafts.”). 
 205. See Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,038. 
 206. See Macro Int’l Inc., Design and Testing of Overdraft Disclosures: Phase Two, at 
v–vi (2009), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20091112a4. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/2WVJ-36GT] (reporting that “about half [of overdrafters] said that 
they would have preferred that the bank deny the transaction”). 
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overdrafters would prefer transactions incurring overdraft fees not be 
completed. 
3. Impact of Regulatory Intervention. — In commenting on the likely 
impact of changes to Regulation E, industry experts predicted that the 
result would be higher fees or a reduction in bank services given that 
“overdraft fees . . . subsidize other checking account features consumers 
enjoy, such as maintenance fee-free checking accounts, or free online bill 
payment.”208 Understanding the impact of changes to the overdraft opt-
in regime—and the extent to which these are offset by sophisticated 
firms—can usefully inform debates about the desirability of behavioral 
policy interventions in consumer finance markets. 
Figure 6 above shows that overdraft revenue decreased significantly 
following changes to the overdraft default rules. Service charges on de-
posit accounts declined by 14% over the year following the Board’s 
changes. Banks do not appear to have recovered these losses.209 
Have overdraft losses been offset by increases in other types of bank 
fees? Figure 2 above illustrates that free checking has decreased by 40% 
since 2010. However, this decrease is concentrated in banks above the 
$10 billion Durbin cutoff. Unlike Durbin, the new overdraft opt-in re-
gime applies to large and small banks alike. In fact, smaller banks, which 
were more dependent on overdraft for revenue, were hit harder by the 
new opt-in default.210 As such, the fee increases observed appear to be 
more related to Durbin than to changes in banks’ overdraft policies.211 
But we know that the share of bank customers opted in to overdraft 
protection (and thus susceptible to incurring overdraft fees) decreased 
significantly following the new rule, from 100% to 16.1%.212 Even among 
frequent overdrafters, only 45% have opted in to overdraft protection.213 
                                                                                                                           
 207. A 2012 Pew study reported that 75% of people who reported overdrafting said 
that they would have preferred the nonrecurring debit transactions be declined. Pew Ctr. 
on the States, supra note 192, at 2, 5. 
 208. Electronic Fund Transfers, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,039. 
 209. In fact, overdraft revenue may have decreased further since 2010. Banks’ “Service 
Charges on Deposit Accounts” line item includes monthly maintenance fees, which 
doubled for banks above the $10 billion threshold in response to the Durbin Amendment. 
See supra Figure 3. 
 210. CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 60 (“Overdraft and NSF 
fees also compose 37% of study banks’ total deposit service charges and . . . overdraft and 
NSF fees make up an even larger share—over 60%—of total deposit service charges among 
community banks.”). As a result, smaller banks are more focused on opting in customers 
to overdraft protection. Community banks, for example, report opt-in rates of around 
60%. Willis, supra note 55, at 1184 (citing CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 
35, at 29). 
 211. Disentangling the two, however, is difficult: Both were enacted around 2010. 
 212. See CFPB, Study of Overdraft Programs, supra note 35, at 29. The opt-in rate is 
22.3% for new accounts, which are easier to opt in to because they involve more direct 
contact with consumers. Id. at 30. 
 213. Id. 
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4. Unintended Consequences of Intervention. — One way to interpret the 
higher opt-in rate for frequent overdrafters is that motivated banks seek 
to avoid the opt-in default for highly lucrative customers. The economic 
rationale for such behavior is clear: Prior to changes to the default rule, 
9% of customers generated 84% of overdraft and NSF revenue.214 By opt-
ing in just this 9%, banks could recover nearly all of their overdraft 
revenue. However, another interpretation of this evidence is that fre-
quent overdrafters like overdraft as a product—that is, they prefer over-
draft protection to their transactions being declined.215 Disentangling 
these two explanations is challenging, but well-designed regulation will 
discourage targeting of financially vulnerable consumers while still 
making overdraft as a product available to consumers who want it. 
Table 1 below summarizes the three postcrisis interventions dis-
cussed in Part I. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 214. Id. at 18. 
 215. Professor Cass Sunstein suggests this rationale: For frequent overdrafters, “[i]t is 
plausible to think that opting in is a good idea. If they cannot borrow from their bank, 
they might have to borrow from someone else—which would mean a level of 
inconvenience . . . and potentially equivalent or higher interest rates.” Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 210, 215 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nudges 
vs. Shoves]. 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF INTERVENTIONS 
Postcrisis 
Intervention Policy Problem 
Regulatory 
Approach to 
Problem 
Solving 
Impact of 
Regulatory 
Intervention 
Unintended 
Consequences of 
Intervention 
Durbin 
Amendment 
Interchange 
became a large 
operating cost 
for merchants 
as use of credit 
and debit for 
payment 
exploded. 
 
Impose a $0.22 
cap on debit 
interchange 
collected from 
merchants. 
Bank 
interchange 
revenue fell by 
$6.5 billion 
annually. 
Monthly 
checking 
account fees 
doubled. Free 
checking 
decreased 
substantially. 
Intervention 
increased checking 
account fees for 
consumers. 
Intervention may 
have shifted some 
consumers to 
credit. Intervention 
increased 
interchange fees for 
small-ticket 
merchants. 
CARD Act Credit card 
contracts 
increased in 
complexity. 
Unanticipated 
consumer fees 
arose. 
Restrict 
unannounced 
fee increases 
and back-end 
penalty fees. 
There were fee 
reductions of 
$12 billion 
annually. 
There is little 
evidence of 
offsetting 
increase in 
interest rates. 
There is some 
evidence of 
anticipatory 
decreases in credit 
availability. 
Overdraft Opt-
In Rule 
Overdraft 
revenue grew 
by more than 
100% in a 
decade, due to 
automated 
overdraft 
programs 
aimed at 
generating 
revenue by, for 
example, 
ordering 
transactions for 
maximum 
overdrafts. 
Prohibit 
overdraft 
protection 
(and thus fees) 
unless 
customers opt 
in, otherwise 
the transaction 
is denied. 
The share of 
customers who 
opted in to 
overdraft 
protection 
decreased 
from 100% to 
16% (22% for 
new 
customers). 
Banks dependent 
on overdraft may 
target frequent 
overdrafters for opt 
in: 10% are 
responsible for 85% 
of overdraft 
revenue. These 
consumers are 
often the poorest 
and least financially 
sophisticated. 
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II. LESSONS OF THESE INTERVENTIONS 
This Article serves as a clear, empirical response to those in the 
regulatory community who believe consumer financial regulation will 
increase overall welfare regardless of the market particulars216 and to 
those who believe any regulatory intervention will be ill fated.217 Neither 
group paints an accurate picture, and my work offers three primary 
lessons: First, the regulation of nonsalient prices is desirable. This is 
because banks exploit consumers’ behavioral limitations—like over-
optimism (for example, consumers’ mistaken beliefs that they will never 
be delinquent in paying credit card bills) and inattention (for example, 
consumers’ failure to read checking account contracts, which explicitly 
detail the significant costs of overdrafting). Banks charge exorbitant non-
salient prices without worrying about losing customers. As such, 
policymakers must bring discipline to these markets by restricting 
shrouded pricing. 
Second, in consumer finance markets, low-income consumers tend 
to pay higher prices than their high-income counterparts. The existence 
of inequitable cross-subsidization calls for regulatory intervention. These 
cross-subsidies arise for two distinct reasons: (1) High-income consumers 
are less likely to bear hidden penalty fees—because they tend to be more 
attentive and because they are wealthier, so they are less likely to over-
draw their accounts or be delinquent on a credit card payment; and (2) 
high-income consumers have access to the most attractive financial 
products. For example, they transact with payment instruments that pro-
vide rewards for retail purchases. Cash users receive no similar benefits, 
                                                                                                                           
 216. See, for example, Senator Dick Durbin and Representative Peter Welch’s 
response to calls to repeal Durbin, arguing aggressively in favor of regulatory intervention 
in this market: “Make no mistake—Visa, Mastercard[,] and the big banks want to scare 
Congress and regulators away from exerting oversight . . . . They think that by discrediting 
Congressional efforts to rein in their rigged schemes in the past, they will enhance their 
ability to get away with rigged schemes in the future.” Dick Durbin & Peter Welch, 
Sideswiped: The Hidden Motive Behind the Big Bank Push to Repeal Swipe Fee Reform, 
Medium (Sept. 28, 2016), https://medium.com/@SenatorDurbin/sideswiped-the-hidden-
motive-behind-the-big-bank-push-to-repeal-swipe-fee-reform-504b9a097827 [https://perma.cc 
/U9YC-M828]. 
 217. Professor Todd Zywicki has been highly critical of the three regulatory 
interventions studied in this article. See Todd Zywicki, No, the Credit Card Act Is Not a 
Free Lunch, Wash. Post (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/01/13/no-the-credit-card-act-is-not-a-free-lunch/ (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (criticizing the CARD Act); Todd J. Zywicki, Geoffrey A. Manne & 
Julian Morris, Price Controls on Payment Card Interchange Fees: The U.S. Experience 29 
(Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-18, 2014), 
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1418.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4SWD-YE8F] (criticizing the Durbin Amendment to Dodd–Frank financial 
reform legislation); G. Michael Flores & Todd Zywicki, Overdraft Protection Rules Could 
Hurt Consumers More than They Help, Mercatus Ctr. (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www. 
mercatus.org/expert_commentary/overdraft-protection-rules-could-hurt-consumers-more-
they-help [https://perma.cc/5LMZ-43DT] (criticizing overdraft reform).  
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and the result is a regressive transfer from low-income, creditless 
consumers to their wealthier counterparts. 
Third, regulators should follow what banks do—not what they say. 
Every time regulators act, banks caution that consumers will be hurt, 
because affected institutions will have no choice but to pass costs through 
to consumers. These warnings lead many academics and policymakers to 
be skeptical of the desirability of intervention. However, how banks 
respond to regulation is ultimately an empirical question, and one that 
this Article undertakes with surprising results. Despite bank assertions to 
the contrary, in many instances, impacted institutions eat the losses from 
regulation, rather than passing them through to their customers. Being 
too beholden to how we believe banks will respond to regulation—rather 
than following the data to understand how banks actually respond to 
regulation—leads to an overly pessimistic view of regulatory efficacy. This 
Part elaborates on these lessons in greater detail. 
A.  Regulators Should Target Nonsalient Prices 
This Article considers the efficacy of postcrisis price regulations in 
the debit interchange, credit card, and overdraft markets.  
While these three price regulations appear similar, the empirical 
analysis in Part I demonstrates their varied efficacy. Each intervention de-
creased banks’ fee revenue, targeted the same financial institutions, 
received praise from consumer advocates as welfare enhancing, and 
inspired derision from banks as being likely to hurt the same consumers 
it sought to help. Net savings from the CARD Act are on the order of $12 
billion annually.218 Additionally, changes to the overdraft regime have 
improved consumer welfare. The new opt-in default rules decreased the 
share of consumers eligible to incur overdraft fees by nearly 85%.219 
Service charges on deposit accounts declined by around 15%, and these 
losses have not been recovered.220  In stark contrast, consumers are 
harmed by Durbin’s cap on debit interchange fees. Durbin has decreased 
bank interchange revenue (and merchant interchange expense) by 
around $6.5 billion annually,221 and banks have responded to this inter-
vention by doubling account fees.222 The share of bank customers with 
access to a free checking account declined by more than 40 percentage 
                                                                                                                           
 218. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 
145. 
 219. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra Figure 6. There is no precise line item that captures total overdraft 
revenue. Instead, “Service Charges on Deposit Accounts” includes overdraft revenue as 
well as other account fees, like monthly maintenance fees. It is estimated that overdraft 
fees account for over 60% of total service charges. Overdraft revenue likely fell by even 
more than 15%, as bank account fees rose around the same period. Id. 
 221. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 3. 
 222. See id. at 34. 
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points, from 60% of customers to around 20%.223 And merchants—who 
save around $6.5 billion annually from Durbin—largely pocketed the 
reduction in interchange expense, and their profitability rose.224 
Why do three price regulations provoke such different responses by 
banks and, consequently, have such varied implications for consumer 
welfare? The answer is salience. 
Consumers tend to ignore certain aspects of product prices. 
Although they pay attention to salient terms—the sticker price of a car, 
the introductory APR offer on a new credit card solicitation—they ignore 
nonsalient terms—for example, the cost of refinancing and the penalty 
for late payments.225 As consumer finance has become an increasingly do-
it-yourself industry, consumers are responsible for an increasingly intri-
cate set of financial decisions.226 Firms offer more products with greater 
complexity. For example, the sheer number of credit cards consumers 
can choose from has exploded, with each offering different terms and 
rewards.227 These product differences are detailed in contracts that have 
increased in length from one page to more than thirty pages on average, 
giving credit card issuers more room to add hidden terms and fees to 
behemoth agreements that no reasonable consumer will ever read.228 
1. Price Regulation Can Tackle Salience Problems. — Regulations that 
curb banks’ ability to generate revenue from nonsalient pricing terms are 
beneficial. This is especially true if the financial sector is dominated by 
large institutions that are able to exercise monopoly power. When large 
firms have market power, high nonsalient prices mean excess profits for 
banks at the expense of consumers.229 When regulations curb nonsalient 
                                                                                                                           
 223. See supra Figure 2. 
 224. See supra Figure 4 (illustrating, through gas prices, how merchants responded to 
Durbin). 
 225. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 149, at 506 (pointing out that firms regularly 
choose to hide information from customers; for example, banks shroud fees and compete 
only on prices that consumers are attentive to). 
 226. See John Y. Campbell, Howell E. Jackson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Peter Tufano, 
Consumer Financial Protection, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 91, 91–92 (2011) (“Households are 
expected to make decisions about pension plan contributions and payouts, to choose from 
a wide array of credit instruments to fund everything from home purchase to short-term 
cash needs, and more generally to assume a greater level of responsibility for their 
financial well-being.”). 
 227. See generally David S. Evans, The Growth and Diffusion of Credit Cards in 
Society, Payment Card Econ. Rev., Winter 2004, at 59, 61, https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=653382 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting the growth and diffusion of 
credit cards). 
 228. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, Democracy Summer 2007, at 8, 11–12 
(“The additional terms were not designed to make life easier for the customer. Rather, 
they were designed in large part to add unexpected—and unreadable—terms that favor 
the card companies.”). 
 229. The Agarwal model makes clear that to get overall consumer benefit from 
regulation (which means that consumers were paying above cost before), the regulation 
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prices—for example, by capping them (like the CARD Act’s restriction 
on late fees) or by requiring consumers to opt in before incurring them 
(like changes to the overdraft default rules)—banks have a choice. They 
can offset losses by increasing salient prices or they can give up some of 
their rents. If banks choose to raise salient prices to offset these losses, 
they risk losing market share as customers flee to cheaper competitors. 
Empirically, the interventions studied above illustrate banks’ 
reluctance to adjust salient prices: There is no evidence that banks 
recover CARD Act losses by across-the-board interest rate increases, nor is 
there evidence that banks recover losses from the new overdraft regime. 
That said, even if banks had offset their losses, these regulations would 
still have been desirable. The existence of nonsalient prices means 
consumers do not understand the true cost of consumer financial prod-
ucts. A credit customer thinks they are paying a 0% APR but does not 
appreciate that the 0% is only for the first six months or that they will pay 
$35 every time they are delinquent. If they knew about these hidden fees, 
they would make a more educated product choice—perhaps they would 
pick a card with a slightly higher introductory APR but lower 
delinquency fees. Or perhaps they would choose to avoid credit cards 
entirely. Any regulation that restricts banks’ ability to shroud prices will, 
at the very least, help consumers make more informed decisions. 
2. An Alternative to Direct Price Regulation Is a Shock to Consumer 
Attention. — An alternative to reining in nonsalient pricing directly is to 
make consumers aware of these exploitative pricing practices. Banks’ 
initial response to Durbin illustrates the impact of making fees salient on 
both consumer and firm behavior. In the immediate aftermath of 
Durbin, many large banks proposed a $5 monthly fee for customers who 
use their debit cards as a form of purchase. This fee became a rallying cry 
for the Occupy Wall Street movement—protesters burned Bank of 
America debit cards,230 and an online petition against the fee garnered 
more than 200,000 signatures.231 Lawmakers scorned the proposal, with 
then-Vice President Joe Biden labelling it as “incredibly tone deaf”232 and 
Senator Durbin urging consumers to “vote with their feet” and close 
accounts at these institutions.233 Normally inattentive depositors heeded 
                                                                                                                           
needs both shrouding and imperfect competition. See Agarwal et al., Regulating 
Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 114–15. 
 230. Bernard, supra note 89. 
 231. Ann Carrns, Petition on Debit Card Fee Attracts 200,000 Supporters, N.Y. Times: 
Bucks (Oct. 13, 2011), https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/petition-on-debit-
card-fee-attracts-200000-supporters/ [https://perma.cc/KXP7-FAWZ]. 
 232. Amanda Terkel, Joe Biden on Bank of America: ‘At a Minimum, They Are 
Incredibly Tone Deaf,’ HuffPost (Oct. 6, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10 
/06/joe-biden-bank-america-tone-deaf_n_998055.html [https://perma.cc/2WNM-97Z7]. 
 233. Press Release, Senator Dick Durbin, Assistant Senate Majority Leader, U.S. 
Senate, Bank of America’s Outrageous New Fees (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.durbin. 
senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/bank-of-americas-outrageous-new-fees [https://perma.cc/ 
U82M-VVWD]. 
2019] MAKING CONSUMER FINANCE WORK 1563 
 
the call: Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan reported that the 
number of people closing accounts in the immediate aftermath of the 
proposal jumped by more than 20% compared to the same period the 
prior year.234 The proposed $5 fee became so unpopular that all of the 
institutions chose to reverse it. Bank of America’s COO said the bank 
“listened to [its] customers very closely” and decided against moving 
forward with plans to charge this fee.235 While banks still offset Durbin 
losses, the lesson of the failed $5 debit usage fee is clear: Raising the 
salience of a price can incentivize consumers to make more informed 
product choices. 
The potential of such an approach is evident in the overdraft 
domain. Some support paternalistic mandates banning overdraft protec-
tion. But such blanket bans decrease the set of options available to 
consumers, some of whom may prefer the convenience of overdraft 
protection despite its high costs.236 Rather than abandon a behavioral 
nudge in favor of a prohibitive mandate, in the case of overdraft, there is 
room for a salience shock that preserves consumer choice. 
Bank of America implemented a version of a salience shock for 
overdrafts from ATM transactions. Now, consumers can receive a 
notification when withdrawing cash, asking if they want to complete 
transactions that will cause them to overdraft.237 The benefit of this 
approach is that it alerts consumers to penalty fees immediately before 
they are incurred, allowing them to weigh the benefits of completing 
their transactions against the high costs. Priming consumers through 
salience shocks for overdrafts may decrease the frequency of overdraft 
incidents.238 
The same is possible for point-of-sale transactions. If a consumer is 
buying a coffee and is about to overdraft, they could receive an alert 
indicating that if they complete the purchase, they will be charged a fee. 
The alert could also include a reminder that they can set up a less-
expensive overdraft line of credit through their bank that will still allow 
them to complete the transaction. If the consumer is eager for caffeine 
and has no other means of payment, they may elect to complete it and 
                                                                                                                           
 234. Martha C. White, Bank of America’s $5 Debit Fee Led to More Account Closings, 
CEO Says, Time (Jan. 23, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/01/23/bank-of-americas-
5-debit-fee-led-to-more-account-closings-ceo-says/ [https://perma.cc/H3PM-MGLZ]. 
 235. Bernard, supra note 89. 
 236. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, supra note 215, at 215 (highlighting this possibility 
in response to Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53). 
 237. Overdraft Services FAQs, Bank of Am., https://www.bankofamerica.com/ 
deposits/overdraft-services-faqs/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited July 
25, 2019). 
 238. See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: 
Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees, 27 Rev. Fin. Stud. 990, 990 
(2014) (finding in an experimental setting that consumers who face overdraft-related 
questions in surveys are less likely to incur these fees in the survey month, and consumers 
that take multiple overdraft surveys reduce their overdrafts for up to two years). 
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pay the overdraft fee. But making the fee salient should decrease 
overdraft incidence for the 75% of overdrafters who claim they would 
have preferred their transactions be declined to incurring high overdraft 
fees.239 
FIGURE 7: SAMPLE “SALIENCE SHOCK”240 
It is important to distinguish this call for such a salience shock in the 
context of overdraft (such as in Figure 7) from mandatory disclosures. 
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider provide a scathing 
indictment of mandatory disclosures, suggesting consumers suffer from 
two main problems that render disclosures ineffective: (1) an overload 
effect (namely, disclosures are too complex to be understood) and (2) an 
accumulation problem (in other words, it is hard to remember a 
disclosure when it competes in your memory with information about all 
other disclosures—“memory is a sieve”).241 Additionally, many are skepti-
cal of the usefulness of disclosures, noting that financial institutions 
generate rents by exploiting consumers’ tendency to underestimate the 
                                                                                                                           
 239. Pew Ctr. on the States, supra note 192, at 5. 
 240. This Figure demonstrates a potential “salience shock” in the form of a text 
message that Bank of America could send to its consumers during a point-of-sale 
transaction in which they are about to overdraft. 
 241. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 686–90, 719 (2011). 
2019] MAKING CONSUMER FINANCE WORK 1565 
 
likelihood they will make a late payment or overdraft.242 Therefore, 
overly optimistic consumers may opt in to overdraft protection (even if 
the high fees are clearly disclosed) because, although they believe it is 
unlikely they will ever use the service, they want protection in case of an 
emergency. This is why recent changes to overdraft disclosure forms 
proposed by the CFPB are unlikely to be effective.243 Disclosures—even 
very clear ones—may prime consumers to the costs of overdrafting, but it 
is unrealistic to expect most people to retain this information or accu-
rately estimate their likelihood of ever bearing these fees. 
Instead, a behavioral salience shock like alerting consumers to the 
cost of an overdraft fee immediately before an overdraft incident has the 
potential to be successful because it avoids the overload, accumulation, 
and overoptimism problems. This immediate alert is a simple disclosure 
that does not need to be recalled: closer in spirit to the sanitation grades 
outside restaurants that Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider approve of 
than complicated credit card contracts.244 Because relevant information 
is presented to consumers immediately prior to an overdraft occurrence, 
a salience shock also overcomes consumers’ overoptimism.245 It makes 
the cost of overdraft salient when the overdraft incident is imminent, 
instead of long before the incident, when consumers may naively believe 
they will never make use of this service. 
                                                                                                                           
 242. See Barr et al., supra note 38, at 50. 
 243. Professors Bubb and Pildes provide a vivid analogy for why they believe mandated 
disclosures to be ineffective: 
Given the structure of the self-control problem, solving it requires 
forcing or enticing the consumer not to engage in a transaction that, 
even with a clear-eyed understanding of the terms and risks, the 
consumer in that moment wants to make. But while Odysseus could have 
himself forcibly lashed to the mast, no easy way exists for consumers to 
commit themselves not to open that store line of credit promising “no 
payments and no interest for the next 12 months.” . . . After all, 
Odysseus did not instruct his sailors to provide him with a “Total Cost of 
Swimming with the Sirens” disclosure as soon as he got within earshot. 
Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1649. While a fair critique of disclosure in general, this is 
not an indictment of the proposed salience shock because, when made aware of the costs 
of overdrafting, consumers will overwhelmingly choose not to complete a transaction 
likely to incur a large fee. This is consistent with survey evidence suggesting that nearly all 
consumers do not realize they have overdrafted. See Pew Ctr. on the States, supra note 
191, at 4. In this setting, it’s more like Odysseus being tied to the mast when a simple alert 
from his fellow sailors—there are sirens coming and if they lure you off this boat it won’t 
end well—would have sufficed. For an example of an overdraft disclosure form reflecting 
changes proposed by the CFPB, see Know Before You Owe: Current Model Form A-9, 
CFPB, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb_A-9-form-ficus_overdraft 
-model-forms-prototypes.pdf [https://perma.cc/34RC-Y327] (last visited on July 25, 2019). 
 244. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 241, at 743 (“For example, Los Angeles 
County requires restaurants to disclose sanitation ‘grade cards’ on windows (letters ‘A,’ ‘B,’ 
or ‘C’), and these seem to have influenced consumers and, in turn, led to cleanlier 
restaurants.”). 
 245. See id. 
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In proposing this salience shock, I follow the Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider suggestion that “brief, simple, and easy” disclosures work best 
when they are part of a “larger program of social change. Sometimes the 
purpose of mandates is not to give people information for making the 
choice they prefer but rather to induce them to make the choice the 
lawmaker deems preferable.”246 This shock is meant to do precisely 
that—strongly nudge consumers away from the $40 cup of coffee but 
preserve their right to reject the nudge. 
One reason to be confident about the efficacy of a salience shock in 
the overdraft market is that it is already proven to work in practice. The 
U.K. Financial Conduct Authority found that customers who receive text 
alerts when their checking account balances fall close to zero reduce 
overdraft incidents by 24%.247 As a result, all U.K. banking customers now 
receive these notifications.248 
The ability of increased salience to shape consumer choice is evident 
across consumer finance markets: When consumers considering payday 
loans learned how the loans’ financing charges compared with the dollar 
cost of borrowing similar sums on credit cards, the use of payday loans 
fell by 11%.249 The same is true in the credit card market, where the 
CARD Act’s requirement that issuers disclose the benefits of early 
repayment increases consumers’ prepayment significantly, 250  and the 
retail investing market, where consumers made aware of high mutual 
fund fees reallocate investments.251 
Salience shocks can thus be extended to consumer finance products 
more generally. For example, for credit card, mortgage, or student loan 
late fees, a notification reminding a consumer to pay their bill immedi-
ately or incur a penalty would be more effective in discouraging 
delinquency than ex ante disclosure of high penalty fees in these 
contracts. Given many consumers’ limited attention spans, interventions 
                                                                                                                           
 246. Id. at 744. 
 247. Competition & Mkts. Auth., supra note 44. 
 248. Rob Goodman, Red Alert: Banks Must Now Text You if You’re About to Slip into 
Your Overdraft, Sun (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.thesun.co.uk/money/5484712/banks-
must-now-text-you-if-youre-about-to-slip-into-your-overdraft/ [https://perma.cc/3QY2-PFPW]. 
 249. See Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, 
and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. Fin. 1865, 1866–67 (2011) (finding that disclosing the 
difference in charges between payday loans and credit cards in terms of dollar costs 
reduced the take-up of future payday loans by 11% during the subsequent four months). 
 250. See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 
114 (finding that making salient the benefits of early repayment on monthly statements 
increases the number of account holders who repay early). 
 251. See Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly 
Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 605, 640–41 (2014) 
(finding that with a fee instruction, test subjects paid average total fees that were 
approximately 0.11% to 0.14% less than the control group and invested a higher 
percentage of their portfolio in index funds than managed funds). 
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that make prices salient just prior to decisions that precipitate penalties 
will limit costly consumer mistakes. 
It is important to restrict these types of salience interventions and 
dynamically assess when they are most necessary and most likely to be 
effective. Shocking consumers along all the decisions they make with 
notice of all of the possible fees is likely to run into Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider’s “accumulation” problem: “[S]o many disclosures assail dis-
closees that they cannot possibly attend to more than a fraction of them.”252 
As such, salience shocks should target fees and penalties that (1) 
generate significant profits for large financial institutions, and (2) seem 
poorly understood by the consumers incurring them.253 
Experimental evidence sheds light on when “salience shocks” help 
guide consumers toward optimal behavior and when interventions are 
less useful. Compare the success of the United Kingdom’s overdraft 
shock in decreasing monthly overdraft charges by 24% to the failure of 
an experiment in Mexico, in which visually showing consumers that their 
debt burden was risky relative to peers had little impact on overall 
indebtedness and even tended to increase indebtedness in some cases.254 
Professor Ben-Shahar highlights this as proof that “smart disclosure” of 
the kind advocated in this section—“timely-relevant compact 
disclosure”—is unlikely to succeed.255 
But Ben-Shahar’s skepticism is not warranted. Salience shocks can be 
effective when they alert consumers to a cost that they can immediately 
and easily avoid. In the overdraft setting, a consumer about to bear this 
fee when purchasing their morning latte can simply pay with cash or 
begin their morning without caffeine. When a consumer receives a 
notice—even a clear, easy-to-understand notice—that they are likely to 
default on their credit and that to reduce their risk they should 
“maintain [their] debt well below [their] credit limit,” the shock is less 
                                                                                                                           
 252. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 241, at 687. 
 253. For example, precrisis dependency on overdraft income and credit card back-end 
fee income hinted at numerous salience problems. Further work should consider the 
appropriate regulatory design, perhaps developing a model for consumer finance 
analogous to the work of Professor Robin Greenwood (and coauthors) in the 
macroprudential risk arena. See generally Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Jeremy 
C. Stein & Adi Sunderam, Strengthening and Streamlining Bank Capital Regulation, 
Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2017, at 479, 525 (proposing a dynamic stress test 
by each year rounding up the “most highly compensated line managers or traders” and 
then “stress testing the exposures most closely associated with these employees”). Id. at 
525. 
 254. See Enrique Seira, Alan Elizondo & Eduardo Laguna-Müggenburg, Are 
Information Disclosures Effective? Evidence from the Credit Card Market, 9 Am. Econ. J. 
277, 279 (2017); Competition & Mkts. Auth., supra note 44. 
 255. Omri Ben-Shahar, More Failed Nudges: Evidence of Ineffective “Behaviorally 
Informed” Disclosures, Contracts Jotwell (Aug. 10, 2017), https://contracts.jotwell.com/ 
more-failed-nudges-evidence-of-ineffective-behaviorally-informed-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc 
/4LR5-9XPR]. 
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effective because the action demanded of them is more ambiguous.256 
Shocks that highlight for consumers immediate costs and simple, easy 
ways to avoid them are more likely to shape behavior meaningfully. 
B.  Regulators Should Address Inequitable Cross-Subsidies 
Each of the three interventions studied in this Article feature cross-
subsidization of wealthy consumers by their low-income counterparts.257 
The fact that poorer consumers tend to pay higher prices for consumer 
financial products justifies regulation. 
This inequitable cross-subsidization clearly exists in markets with 
salience problems for two distinct reasons. First, low-income consumers 
are more prone to behavioral limitations that financial firms exploit. 
They are less attentive (less likely to read complex credit contracts) and 
more naive (more likely to underestimate the chances that they will pay 
penalty fees).258 Second, these consumers are less financially stable: They 
make less money and, as a result, have fewer funds in their bank 
accounts, increasing the likelihood of overdrafting. Similarly, they have 
                                                                                                                           
 256. See Seira et al., supra note 254, at 279–80, 288 (finding that “‘high risk’ 
messag[ing] . . . decreas[ed] delinquency, with an effect of 8.2 percent of mean 
delinquency”). 
 257. Here, cross-subsidization refers to consumers paying different prices for the same 
good or service. There is a possibility that what is labeled as "inequitable cross-
subsidization" may be understood as price discrimination that occurs in response to the 
differences in the costs of serving different types of consumers. While this is a conceivable 
explanation of price patterns in the overdraft and credit card markets, proponents of this 
argument have difficulty explaining why it is the case that the most behaviorally limited 
consumers are the most expensive for the bank to service. In the interchange market, the 
cross-subsidization of rewards card users by their non-rewards-card counterparts is difficult 
to justify with any cost story. Additionally, intervention would still be justified, since a 
market failure arises from the inability of competitor card networks to compete with 
incumbents. See Pete Lukacs, Leslie Neubecker & Philip Rowan, Fin. Conduct Auth., 
Occasional Paper No. 22, Price Discrimination and Cross-Subsidy in Financial Services 7–8 
(2016) (distinguishing cross-subsidies from price discrimination). 
 258. See, e.g., Nadia Massoud, Anthony Saunders & Barry Scholnick, The Impact of 
Wealth on Financial Mistakes: Evidence from Credit Card Nonpayment, 9 J. Fin. Stability 
26, 28 (2013) (finding that individuals who make avoidable credit card mistakes—for 
example, incurring credit card penalty fees despite having sufficient funds in their deposit 
accounts—tend to be poorer). These authors point out that there is a difference between 
individuals who deliberately go delinquent on credit card payments in spite of having 
sufficient funds available and those who go delinquent because they do not have sufficient 
funds and are facing financial difficulties. Id. Although we expect the latter to primarily be 
lower-income consumers, it is not obvious ex ante that the former—those who make 
mistakes like forgetting to mail checks on time or miscalculating their account balances 
and overdrawing—will be. Wealthier consumers may simply not care about the cost of 
incurring relatively minor fees. However, empirical evidence shows that poorer consumers 
are much more likely to pay avoidable penalty fees. These results are consistent with 
behavioral models that the poor are less financially sophisticated, and hold true even after 
accounting for differences in educational attainment. Id. at 35. 
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less disposable income and thus less money available to repay bills in a 
timely manner. 
Note, however, that these are generalizations: Certainly, some low-
income consumers closely read every financial contract, and some high-
income consumers have lavish spending habits and limited savings. How-
ever, as a general rule, low-income customers disproportionately bear 
shrouded bank fees: An FDIC study estimates that about 20% of consum-
ers with a median household income of $70,000 or more regularly over-
draft, whereas about 40% of consumers living in low-income areas with a 
median annual income of less than $30,000 per year overdraw their ac-
counts and bear penalty fees.259 Similarly, although nearly 70% of custom-
ers below the poverty line are in credit card debt (and thus capable of 
incurring penalty fees), this share is closer to 40% for consumers who 
make more than $100,000.260 Additionally, the wealthy tend to have ac-
cess to cheaper financial products: checking accounts with no monthly 
fees261 and credit cards with attractive rewards and low interest rates. 
These products are often offered at below-cost prices: Consider a $0 
checking account. Providing a checking account is costly to the bank. For 
example, the bank needs to build a national ATM network, hire tellers to 
process transactions, monitor potential fraud in the account, and de-
velop online banking technology. And yet, prior to Durbin, banks offered 
this product for free. They could afford to do this because fee income 
generated primarily from low-income consumers, such as overdraft reve-
nue, helped cover the cost of providing these services.262 
Regulating nonsalient prices will help the low income because it will 
decrease this cross-subsidization. But it can also help the wealthy. 
Avoiding nonsalient fees is time-consuming. Imagine your friend Penny is 
both sophisticated and highly cost sensitive. If there is a penny to be 
saved, she will expend tremendous effort to save it. To avoid potentially 
overdrafting, she either calls her bank to check her account balance 
before making every purchase or pays with cash. She continuously signs 
up for new credit cards to take advantage of 0% APR offers, carefully rec-
ords when these rates expire, and closes the accounts before the 
introductory period ends. She sets alarms on her phone and leaves notes 
on her refrigerator reminding her of deadlines for credit card payments, 
lest she delay by a single day. Avoiding shrouded fees is utility enhancing 
for Penny—she pays less for financial services than her less careful 
counterparts. However, from a societal perspective, this behavior is 
                                                                                                                           
 259. FDIC, 2008 Study of Bank Overdraft Programs, supra note 181, at v. 
 260. Draut & Silva, supra note 146, at 10. 
 261. Prior to Durbin, most consumers had free checking accounts; post-Durbin, only 
the rich, with sufficiently large account balances, have free checking accounts. See 
Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 5, 35. 
 262. Willis, supra note 55, at 1177 (highlighting how banks explicitly subsidize the cost 
of their free checking services with revenue from intentionally steep overdraft fees). 
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inefficient.263 Even consumers who benefit from cross-subsidization are 
inefficiently expending energy to preserve these benefits. More up-front 
pricing of consumer products would reduce these inefficiencies. 
Importantly, inequitable cross-subsidization is also commonplace in 
markets that do not feature price shrouding. Even in the absence of 
salience problems, regulators should intervene to address regressive 
transfers. For example, many who study the interchange market 
highlight its unfairness: Low-income consumers pay higher prices for 
retail goods than the wealthy.264 When consumers pay in cash, merchants 
pay nothing to process these transactions. Cash-paying consumers tend 
to be the poorest—those without access to debit or credit instruments.265 
When consumers pay with debit cards, merchants pay relatively low inter-
change fees. Debit-paying consumers are slightly better off than those 
who use cash, but still relatively low income, without access to credit.266 
Credit usage is most pronounced among the wealthy.267 When consumers 
pay with rewards cards, merchants pay exorbitant interchange fees, often 
upwards of 4% of the value of the transaction. Some of that 4% goes to 
the card networks, which profit from interchange. But some of it also 
goes to wealthy consumers: A customer who uses a rewards card to buy a 
new pair of $100 sneakers gets 1.5% cash back, paying only $98.50 for 
their new Nikes. A customer who uses cash to make that same purchase 
                                                                                                                           
 263. See, e.g., Chavie Lieber, The Credit Card Obsessives Who Game the System—And 
Share Secrets Online, Racked (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.racked.com/2015/4/1/ 
8320731/credit-card-points-miles [https://perma.cc/K5JR-DAHK] (“For most of us, this is 
a full-time obsession—I literally work 16 hours a day, seven days a week. It requires a lot of 
organization and spreadsheets.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ben 
Schlappig, operator of credit card rewards blog One Mile at a Time)). 
 264. Aaron Klein, America’s Poor Subsidize Wealthier Consumers in a Vicious Income 
Inequality Cycle, NBC News: Think (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/ 
opinion/america-s-poor-subsidize-wealthier-consumers-vicious-income-inequality-cycle-
ncna845091 [https://perma.cc/5FL5-W7KW] (discussing how credit card users, especially 
those with more money in the account and thus more money to use, ultimately pay less by 
getting back some of what they have paid in the forms of cash back, reward points, or 
frequent-flyer miles). 
 265. Raynil Kumar, Tayeba Maktabi & Shaun O’Brien, 2018 Findings from the Diary of 
Consumer Payment Choice 9 (2018), https://www.frbsf.org/cash/files/federal-reserve-
cpo-2018-diary-of-consumer-payment-choice-110118.pdf [https://perma.cc/ LP23-E4QX] 
(“For individuals in households that earn $50,000 or less, cash is the most common form 
of payment, followed by debit. As income rises, credit and debit replace cash as the most 
commonly used payment instrument.”). 
 266. See id. (finding that for households with less than $25,000 in annual income, the 
most common means of purchase is cash; for households who make between $50,000 and 
$75,000, debit; and for households that make more than $125,000, credit). 
 267. See id. at 10 (noting that “[a]t incomes above $100,000, households use credit 
cards to pay for the largest number of transactions”—33% of their total. In contrast, those 
with incomes below $25,000 disproportionately use cash—for nearly 50% of their 
transactions—and use credit cards only 7% of the time). 
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pays the full $100.268 These dollar values may seem minute, but they 
accumulate quickly: On average, card-using households receive over 
$1,100 from cash users every year.269 Rewards are subsidized by higher 
retail prices for low-income consumers. 
One way to decrease the incidence of regressive transfers is to ban 
loyalty rewards programs. Economists estimate that eliminating credit 
rewards would increase consumer welfare.270 The intuition is simple: 
Banks generate high interchange revenue by offering attractive rewards 
programs to card-using consumers. If these rewards programs disappear, 
consumers will have no incentive to transact with payment instruments 
that are especially expensive to merchants. Less frequent use of these 
cards will lower merchant costs. As the conceptual framework offered in 
the Appendix illustrates, lower merchant costs will lead to lower retail 
prices. These savings will accrue most significantly to the low income, 
eliminating the “reverse-Robin-Hood problem” of the current payment 
regime.271 
As with regulations to rein in price shrouding, eliminating this cross-
subsidy clearly helps the low income, decreasing the prices they bear. But 
it helps consumers more broadly as well. Many are point-chasing fanatics, 
maintaining several credit cards and expending both mental energy and 
time to determine which card to use for groceries, which offers the high-
est cash-back rewards, and when to close accounts before teaser offers 
expire.272 This may be utility enhancing for individuals who derive pleas-
ure from maximizing rewards; however, it is hard to view this intensity of 
search as socially desirable.273 
                                                                                                                           
 268. See Schuh et al., supra note 48, at 1 (“[M]erchants mark up their retail prices for 
all consumers by enough to recoup the merchant fees from credit card sales. This retail 
price markup for all consumers results in credit-card-paying consumers being subsidized 
by consumers who do not pay with credit cards . . . .”). 
 269. Id. at 3. 
 270. See, e.g., id. at 3–4. 
 271. See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: 
Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 Rutgers L.J. 419, 420 
(2009) (“Robin Hood . . . robbed from the rich and gave to the poor. . . . [E]conomists 
have postulated that credit card companies do the opposite—forcing low-income cash 
customers to pay higher prices for retail goods that effectively fund . . . rewards that go 
predominantly to affluent cardholders.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Rob Copeland, If You Have 29 Credit Cards, You’re Probably a 
Millennial, Wall St. J. (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-you-have-29-credit-
cards-youre-probably-a-millennial-1490972634 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(detailing how “[f]anatics sign up for new cards in every city they visit,” obtain “multiple 
versions of the same card,” and “angle to use their cards to cover tabs at restaurants”). 
One tale of point-chasing obsession stands out: A customer, so disappointed about being 
rejected for a Chase Sapphire Reserve, constructed a costume of the card out of cardboard 
and sent the bank a photo, hoping for reconsideration. See id. 
 273. See Lieber, supra note 263 (“‘[A] large part of the [point-chasing] community 
doesn’t actually like to travel, but they love gaming the system.’ ‘It’s like extreme 
couponing: Those people get, like, 10,000 diapers for free even though they don’t have 
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Banning credit card rewards is unlikely to be a popular regulatory 
approach. A less aggressive alternative to eliminate cross-subsidization is 
to allow retailers to price discriminate. Inequities in this market arise 
from the fact that retail prices are uniform. It can cost merchants $4 to 
process a $100 credit card transaction, but there are legal and contrac-
tual barriers that prohibit merchants from surcharging credit card 
consumers to cover those $4 of interchange expense.274 If merchants 
could pass through these processing fees to card users alone, the result 
would be lower retail prices for the cash-paying, low-income consumers. 
And card users could decide whether the benefits of card usage—for ex-
ample, the cash back, the airline miles—were worth paying an extra $4. 
An even milder approach is to allow merchants to encourage 
consumers to use cheaper forms of payment. Card networks ban 
merchants from directly signaling to consumers that rewards cards have 
higher processing fees than other cards. These “antisteering provisions” 
make it impossible for retailers to nudge consumers toward cards with 
lower interchange expense.275 Allowing merchants to suggest consumers 
use cheaper payment alternatives will decrease inequitable cross-subsidies 
by reducing the incidence of transactions with rewards cards. Eliminating 
antisteering restrictions would also encourage the emergence of credit 
cards with lower interchange fees: Because merchants will be able to 
push consumers to use cheaper cards, there will be greater incentive for 
card networks to compete to be the card most recommended by retailers. 
1. Regulators Should Use Consumer Protection Authority to Tackle 
Inequitable Cross-Subsidization. — Through a series of recent antitrust 
cases, merchants sought to implement some of the policies proposed in 
this Article: allowing retail price discrimination through surcharging 
consumers who use expensive payment instruments276 and removing 
                                                                                                                           
kids. In this case, some people care about screwing the airline,’ . . . .” (quoting members of 
the credit-card blogging community)). 
 274. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518 (McKinney 2019) (prohibiting merchant 
surcharges on credit card users); Tex. Bus. & Com. § 604A.0021 (2019) (same); see also 
Credit or Debit Card Surcharges Statutes, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Oct. 13, 
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/credit-or-debit-card 
-surcharges-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/6N47-BJJ6] (tallying similar state statutes and 
noting that eleven states and Puerto Rico have banned merchant credit card surcharges). 
 275. See infra section II.B.1. 
 276. See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017) 
(holding that no-surcharge statutes, which bar merchants from charging consumers 
higher prices for credit card usage, implicate First Amendment concerns); see also Bruce 
D. Sokler, Robert G. Kidwell & Farrah Short, What Have Merchants Gained from Payment 
Card Antitrust Litigation?, Mintz (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.mintz.com/insights-
center/viewpoints/2301/2016-08-what-have-merchants-gained-payment-card-antitrust 
[https://perma.cc/FVL4-PEPJ] (detailing the history of payment card antitrust litigation 
and its effects on merchants). Interestingly, in some cases merchants are allowed to offer 
cash discounts and discounts for debit (versus credit) usage, although these rules vary by 
state and even by merchant. Id. 
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antisteering prohibitions.277 The antitrust argument is that these prac-
tices help too-big-to-fail institutions engage in anticompetitive exercises 
of market power, creating barriers to entry for new competitors, facilitat-
ing collusion to generate supracompetitive profits. 
Historically, antitrust has been a powerful tool to rein in card 
network behavior.278 In the mid-1990s, Visa’s and MasterCard’s “exclu-
sivity rules,” which prohibited member banks from issuing cards from 
emerging competitors (Discover and American Express), were found to 
reduce competition unfairly.279 And after extensive litigation, card net-
works agreed to make changes to “Honor All Cards” rules, which 
required merchants to accept all networks’ cards (even high-cost re-
wards) if they wanted to accept any of them,280 and card networks agreed 
to pay billions in damages for price-fixing.281 
However, recent trends in antitrust—directly related to inter-
change—give rise to questions about the viability of continued reliance 
on judicial enforcement in this setting.282 In Ohio v. American Express, 
believed by some to be the “most significant antitrust opinion by the 
Court in more than a decade,”283 the Supreme Court held that American 
Express’s antisteering terms—which prohibit merchants from encourag-
ing consumers to use credit cards with lower interchange fees—are not 
anticompetitive.284 The Court’s basic argument was that because the in-
terchange market is two-sided (card networks depend on simultaneously 
                                                                                                                           
 277. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2289 (2018) (finding that 
although antisteering provisions may restrict card networks’ incentives to decrease 
merchant interchange rates, determination of whether these provisions are 
anticompetitive requires consideration of countervailing benefits that accrue to consumers 
from using rewards cards). 
 278. See generally K. Craig Wildfang & Ryan W. Marth, The Persistence of Antitrust 
Controversy and Litigation in Credit Card Networks, 73 Antitrust L.J. 675 (explaining the 
history of antitrust litigation against credit card networks). 
 279. See id. at 684. 
 280. Although “Honor All Cards” lawsuits for debit versus credit cards resulted in 
settlement, merchant suits to decouple rewards credit acceptance from nonpremium 
credit card acceptance remain live, and a new set of litigation is likely to emerge around 
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Adam Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: Digital Wallets and the Honor All Devices Rule 30 
(2016), http://www.creditslips.org/files/pandoras-digital-box.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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 281. In fact, a recent class action suit alleging collusive pricing practices was settled but 
then invalidated, largely because it restricted merchants’ future ability to bring such suits. 
AnnaMaria Andriotis, Visa, Mastercard Near Settlement over Card-Swipe Fees, Wall St. J. 
(June 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/visa-mastercard-near-settlement-over-card-
swipe-fees-1530193694 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 282. See Lina Khan, The Supreme Court Just Quietly Gutted Antitrust Law, Vox (July 
3, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/7/3/17530320/antitrust-american-
express-amazon-uber-tech-monopoly-monopsony [https://perma.cc/UWV4-FS5Z]. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2278 (2018). 
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marketing their product to merchants to accept their cards and to 
consumers to use them), proof of anticompetitive harm must consider 
both sides of this market.285 Thus, although one side of the market 
(merchants) may be harmed by antisteering provisions, this harm must 
be weighed against countervailing benefits that accrue to consumers who 
use these cards and get attractive rewards.286 
Many antitrust experts point out flaws in this reasoning287  and 
believe that the Court erred by ignoring clear impediments to 
competition that eliminate the incentive for card networks to compete to 
offer lower merchant interchange rates.288 This is a reasonable critique. 
However, independent of any concerns about monopoly pricing, the 
existence of inequitable cross-subsidies in the interchange market, and 
more broadly in most financial markets, justifies intervention on 
consumer protection grounds because it is unfair that low-income 
consumers pay higher prices than their wealthy counterparts. 
Specifically, Section 5531 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act 
of 2010 provides the CFPB with broad authority to intervene to prohibit 
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]” (collectively, 
“UDAAPs”).289 Practices may be unfair, deceptive, and abusive—but each 
prohibition is governed by distinct standards:290 Roughly, unfair acts are 
those likely to cause substantial injury, cannot be reasonably avoided, and 
lack countervailing benefits;291 deceptive acts are those likely to mislead 
consumers;292 and abusive practices are those that materially interfere 
with a consumer’s ability “to understand a term or condition of a 
consumer financial product or service,” or that take unreasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 285. See id. at 2286. 
 286. Id. 
 287. See, e.g., Pallavi Guniganti, Amex Ruling Is an “Economic Nightmare,” 
Hovenkamp Says, Global Competition Rev. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com 
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 288. The District Court in Ohio v. American Express Co. found, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s dissenters agreed, that antisteering discourages card network competition. 138 S. 
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 289. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012). 
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also “deceptive” or “unfair.” See Adam Levitin, CFPB “Abusive” Rulemaking?, Credit Slips 
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/10/cfpb-abusive-rulemaking.html 
[https://perma.cc/3QZJ-D8XX] (indicating that out of the 206 enforcement actions to 
date, the CFPB has brought “abusive” claims in only 27 cases, and in all but one the 
allegations alleged to be abusive were also alleged to be either unfair or deceptive). 
 291. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (defining unfair practices). 
 292. See CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 2016) (defining deceptive 
practices). 
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advantage of a consumer’s lack of understanding of the risks, costs, or 
conditions of consumer finance products or services.293 
Financial institution practices that create cross-subsidies, like 
antisteering provisions and prohibitions on merchant surcharging, are 
likely UDAAPs because they are unfair to low-income consumers: These 
consumers pay more for goods because they do not receive rewards 
kickbacks. In many cases, these consumers cannot reasonably act to avoid 
injury because they do not have access to premium rewards cards. Alt-
hough there are countervailing benefits from loyalty rewards, crucially, 
these do not accrue to the same class of customers who suffer harm.294 
Although the CFPB has yet to assert its UDAAP power in this setting, it 
likely has the authority to target payment products for the cross-subsidies 
they create. 
Importantly, UDAAP power—unlike antitrust authority—does not 
require that consumer advocates demonstrate proof of anticompetitive 
harm to justify intervention. Thus, this Article hopes to push policy-
makers away from a singular focus on market concentration, which 
creates unnecessary hurdles that, in the current judicial climate, may be 
insurmountable.295 It is true that the financial sector is concentrated and 
becoming increasingly more so: The five largest banks hold more than 
40% of the domestic deposits in the United States.296 This has prompted 
calls by policymakers and academics to “break up the banks.”297 Card 
networks are even more concentrated—Visa and Mastercard control 
more than 70% of the payment card market.298 It is plausible, and 
perhaps even likely, that the markets studied here feature large financial 
institutions using their market power to generate supracompetitive 
profits.299 However, even abstracting away from market power concerns, 
regulators can—and should—intervene in these markets on consumer 
protection grounds. The fact that wealthy consumers pay lower prices 
                                                                                                                           
 293. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (defining abusive practices). 
 294. See supra section II.B. 
 295. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 282 (suggesting that the Court’s decision in Ohio v. 
American Express makes it harder to enforce antitrust laws and consequently makes it easier 
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U.S. Card Processing Company This Year, Forbes (May 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com 
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 299. In other words, profits above what could be sustained in a competitive market. 
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than their low-income counterparts justifies regulation. The focus on 
market power is thus unnecessarily limiting. 
One important caveat is that although regulators can and should 
intervene in these markets, not all interventions will necessarily be bene-
ficial. Durbin provides a powerful example of how ill-designed regulation 
can exacerbate the problems it seeks to correct. The interchange market 
features an inequitable cross-subsidy: Low-income consumers pay more 
for retail goods than their wealthier, rewards-earning counterparts. 
Rather than help these consumers, Durbin harmed them. As a result of 
the cap on debit interchange fees, bank fees doubled.300 These increases 
are borne entirely by low-income consumers, because fees are waived for 
wealthy consumers with sufficiently high account balances.301 
Unlike Durbin, well-designed interchange regulation should focus 
on credit interchange. The success of this approach is elucidated by 
predecessor legislation in Australia, where the cap on credit card inter-
change fees decreased the benefits to banks from credit usage: Conse-
quently, banks lowered credit card rewards, thereby decreasing cross-
subsidization of the wealthy by their low-income counterparts.302 
Unfortunately, the Durbin Amendment did not follow the Australian 
example. Instead, this legislation capped debit interchange fees, leaving 
credit interchange fees unchecked. Rather than reduce credit card 
rewards, banks were incentivized to offer even more generous rewards 
programs to encourage consumers to use credit, for which interchange 
rates remain unregulated.303 For consumers without access to credit 
cards, this has widened the gap between the prices they pay and the 
prices the wealthy pay for retail goods. For the financially fragile with 
access to credit, the nudge toward credit has led to higher indebtedness, 
trapping these consumers in expensive cycles of debt. Overall, Durbin 
has harmed consumers—especially the low income—increasing the 
                                                                                                                           
 300. Zywicki et al., supra note 217, at 8 fig.4 (displaying an increase in average bank 
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 301. Mukharlyamov & Sarin, Price Regulation, supra note 85, at 35 (finding that more 
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(testimony of Philip W. Lowe, Assistant Governor, Financial System Group, Reserve Bank 
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 303. See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Did Durbin Amendment Lead to Unintended Credit Card 
Splurge?, Am. Banker (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/did-
durbin-amendment-lead-to-unintended-credit-card-splurge (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (noting that fees collected from credit cards were almost twice as much as 
compared to debit card transactions after the amendment). 
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inequitable cross-subsidies that well-designed intervention in this market 
should address. 
2. Regulation that Helps Low-Income Consumers—Even if at the Expense of 
Their Wealthy Counterparts—Is Desirable. — When policymakers debate 
regulation, they often discuss consumers as a group. Calling for a 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, then-Professor Warren described 
the inequities of a market with profit-hungry banks on one side and naive 
consumers on another. The issue with these markets, she argued, was that 
prior to the crisis regulators would “focus intently on bank profitability 
and far less on the financial impact on customers of many of the products 
the banks sell.”304 
This was certainly true of the precrisis regulatory regime. However, 
this view misses the important nuance that consumers are 
heterogeneous. It is overly simplistic to think of these markets as 
featuring bad actors (banks) exploiting naive actors (consumers). It is 
still simplistic (though less so) to think of these markets as they are 
described in this Article—as featuring banks, sophisticated consumers, 
and unsophisticated consumers. Sophistication and income status tend 
to be closely related: Higher income consumers tend to be more sophisti-
cated and have more money in their bank accounts. Practically, this 
means that the high penalty fees that low-income customers are likely to 
pay subsidize banks offering cheaper financial products to those who are 
wealthier.305 
There are reasons to believe that reducing this inequitable cross-
subsidization can be Pareto improving—said another way, that it is 
possible to decrease the prices that poor consumers pay for financial 
products without making the wealthy worse off. As illustrated in the 
Appendix, this can result if banks charge supracompetitive prices to 
generate excessive rents.306 Imagine a large sneaky bank. Sneaky Bank 
rips off customers by charging high prices: For a checking account that 
costs $100 to provide, Sneaky Bank charges $105. It also charges consum-
ers that overdraft an extra $200. This means unsophisticated consumers 
pay $305 for their checking accounts; and sophisticated consumers pay 
$105. Now imagine that regulators cap overdraft fees at $0. Sneaky Bank 
is making much less revenue from unsophisticated consumers. But if 
Sneaky Bank raises baseline checking account prices to cover these 
losses, then it may lose customers. Faced with this possibility, banks like 
Sneaky Bank may choose not to offset losses from regulation of non-
salient prices. This explains why banks do not raise salient prices in 
response to CARD Act and overdraft losses. 
                                                                                                                           
 304. Warren, supra note 228 (emphasis added). 
 305. See Willis, supra note 55, at 1178 (pointing out that because overdraft fees 
“effectively subsidize all checking accounts, the effect is that the poorest account holders 
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 306. See infra Appendix. 
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What if instead Sneaky Bank was less sneaky: It charged $100 for 
checking accounts, which cost them exactly $100 to provide. But then a 
competitor realized that it could offer free checking (a $0 bank account) 
and cover costs by charging $200 in overdraft fees to only unsophisti-
cated consumers. Sneaky Bank would have been forced to change its 
pricing to mimic this competitor, otherwise it would have lost all its 
customers. This means that sophisticated consumers who avoid overdraft 
fees end up with cheaper bank accounts even though banks do not 
necessarily generate rents from pricing in this manner. If a regulator caps 
overdraft fees at $0, Sneaky Bank will be forced to raise checking account 
prices to cover costs. In this example, sophisticated consumers would be 
harmed, because their checking account costs increase from $0 to $100. 
This intervention would not increase overall consumer welfare. However, 
it would increase welfare for unsophisticated consumers, who were being 
disadvantaged by shrouded pricing. This is a progressive reform that 
would create more equitable financial markets. 
The stylized Sneaky Bank examples are meant to illustrate a simple 
point: No matter the market dynamics at play—whether oligopoly with 
banks making excessive profits, or perfect competition with zero bank 
profits, or some middle ground—regulation to tackle cross-subsidization 
is desirable.307 The relevant metric for policymakers should not be wheth-
er intervention increases consumer welfare overall but rather whether it 
creates a more equitable financial system. Practically, the interventions 
this Article advocates for in the interchange market (like decreasing 
loyalty rewards or allowing merchants to surcharge wealthy customers 
who use cards with higher interchange fees) may not benefit every group 
of consumers. The wealthy, who currently pay low retail prices because of 
rewards kickbacks, may see their prices rise. That is a feature of well-
designed regulation, not a bug. Regulation should put a weight on the 
scale in favor of those disadvantaged in consumer markets. While this can 
mean tilting the scales in favor of naive consumers and away from sophis-
ticated banks, it can also mean tilting the scales in favor of naive 
consumers and away from more sophisticated consumers. 
C.  Watch What Firms Do, Not What They Say 
This Article illustrates the dangers of judging the desirability of reg-
ulation based on how banks say they will respond to intervention. As 
profit-maximizing institutions, these firms have every incentive to prevent 
regulators from curbing their behavior. To discourage costly regulation, 
                                                                                                                           
 307. It is worth noting that many prominent law and economics scholars are skeptical 
of legal rules to accomplish such redistribution and instead prefer redistribution through 
progressive income taxation. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal 
System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 
667, 674–75 (1994). While not the subject of this Article, future research should consider 
whether more progressive taxes can right the inequities in consumer finance markets 
more efficiently than direct intervention. 
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every time policymakers propose a change, banks argue that the result 
will be higher consumer costs and less access to desirable financial 
products.308 However, the empirical evidence in this Article suggests that 
financial institutions’ assertions about how interventions will harm con-
sumers are often overstated.309 Analyzing regulatory efficacy requires 
thorough data-driven analysis of what banks actually do in consumer 
finance markets, not simply trusting banks’ assertions that losses will be 
passed through to consumers. 
In commenting on the CARD Act, large card issuers argued that 
consumers, not banks, would bear the costs of restrictions on penalty fee 
revenue and unanticipated interest rate hikes.310 Financial institutions 
noted that before the CARD Act, the ability to freely adjust credit card 
prices allowed card issuers to price-discriminate between risky customers, 
to whom the provision of credit is expensive, and stable customers, to 
whom the provision of credit is less costly.311 Because the CARD Act 
restricts penalty fees and interest rate changes, card companies said they 
would lose this potential for price discrimination and all consumers’ 
prices would increase to cover the likely defaults of the riskiest 
borrowers.312 Even academics who supported regulating credit card pen-
alty fees took heed of banks’ caution and warned that “the reduced 
revenue stream to lenders from these fees would mean that other rates 
and fees would be adjusted to compensate.”313 
Early reports of the CARD Act suggested that banks adjusted in the 
manner they said they would, and that the intervention increased the 
cost of borrowing across the board for borrowers of all risk types. Popular 
press articles suggested that the CARD Act increased interest rates for 
consumers, 314  and Federal Reserve commentators postulated that the 
                                                                                                                           
 308. See, e.g., Who Pays for Bank Regulation?, Goldman Sachs (June 2014), 
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/public-policy/regulatory-reform/who-pays-for-
bank-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/X9XH-QZG9] (“[L]ow-income consumers and 
small businesses . . . have paid the largest price for increased bank regulation.”). 
 309. See supra sections I.A.3, I.B.3 & I.C.3. 
 310. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Credit Card Market, supra note 175 
(“The cost of credit is higher [for consumers] than it would be in the absence of the 
CARD Act.”). 
 311. See, e.g., id. at 11 (noting that the CARD Act has limited card issuers’ ability to 
adjust interest rates based on consumers’ payment behavior). 
 312. See, e.g., Visa Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Nov. 22, 2013), http:// 
d1lge852tjjqow.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001403161/de11876c-2110-47d2-9026-367deae048e9. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/BVC4-BB6V] (stating that the CARD Act “could increase the costs 
of card issuance or decrease the flexibility of issuers to charge market-based interest rates 
and fees on credit card accounts”). 
 313. See Barr et al., supra note 38, at 50. 
 314. See, e.g., Curtis Arnold & MoneyBuilder, CARD Act May Have Cost Consumers 
Billions, Forbes (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2012/02/ 
21/card-act-may-have-cost-consumers-billions/#2b6ae9a75bbb [https://perma.cc/6HC5-HUT8] 
(“Based on roughly $800 billion in outstanding U.S. credit card debt over much of the 
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CARD Act may have led to closures of now-unprofitable consumer 
accounts315 and lower credit limits for customers.316 The financial sector 
suggested that the CARD Act increased interest rates by more than 72 
basis points, pointing out that “[w]hile the CARD Act has provided clear 
and significant benefits to consumers, there have also been significant 
tradeoffs, specifically, higher costs and less availability for credit card 
credit.”317 
However, these early analyses conflated the impact of the CARD Act 
with general economic conditions. The period surrounding its enact-
ment coincided with the worst economic downturn since the Great 
Depression.318 This makes drawing causal inferences challenging: Do 
banks close credit card accounts and decrease credit limits because of the 
CARD Act, or because aggregate consumption—and thus demand for 
credit—dropped off because of the Recession?319 
Thorough empirical work on the CARD Act is able to disentangle 
the impact of the legislation from the impact of the decrease in credit de-
mand that has followed from the Recession and comes to a much more 
positive outlook on its efficacy. Working with a unique panel dataset from 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, economists compared 
consumer credit card accounts, which were impacted by the CARD Act, 
to small business accounts, which were left unregulated.320 Because both 
consumers and small businesses were impacted by the Recession, this 
approach was able to isolate the impact of the CARD Act. The econo-
mists found that although fees on consumer credit cards decreased sub-
stantially following the CARD Act, there has been no offsetting increase 
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in interest rates or reduction in credit availability.321 The overall effect of 
the CARD Act has been thus to reduce credit costs for consumers by 
nearly $12 billion annually.322 This empirical work demonstrates that, 
despite banks’ warnings, the CARD Act did not increase the cost of credit 
or decrease its availability. Although financial institutions stated they 
would offset CARD Act losses, concerns about losing customers appear to 
have limited their adjustment. Accurate insights about regulatory efficacy 
rely on studying how firms actually respond to consumer-oriented 
regulations. 
1. Listening to Banks Can Lead to Poorly Designed Regulation. — 
Overreliance on banks’ comments on how they plan to respond to regu-
lation can lead to ineffective regulation, as the Durbin Amendment 
demonstrates. Initially, policymakers proposed regulating credit, rather 
than debit, interchange.323 This made sense: In the decade leading up to 
the Recession, card issuers had introduced premium cards with high in-
terchange rates. To incentivize consumers to use these cards, they offered 
rewards. The result of the growth in rewards credit cards was that (1) 
consumers were using credit cards more, thus increasing their indebtedness; 
and (2) the inequitable cross-subsidization of the wealthy grew, because only 
the wealthy had access to these payment instruments.324 
In Australia, predecessor regulation that capped credit card inter-
change successfully addressed the problems in this market.325 Australia’s 
cap on credit card interchange increased the use of debit cards, which 
are generally regarded as a safer payment instrument because they de-
couple financial transacting from borrowing. This means that debit 
usage, unlike credit usage, does not increase indebtedness. Because 
credit card interchange became less profitable, card issuers had less in-
centive to encourage credit usage and thus lowered rewards, decreasing 
the cross-subsidization of the wealthy by their low-income counterparts. 
In this case, a potentially useful regulation (restriction on credit 
interchange) was abandoned in favor of a harmful one (restriction on 
debit interchange) precisely because regulators were too attentive to 
banks’ warnings about the impact of intervention. Banks assured 
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policymakers that capping credit interchange fees would increase the 
cost of credit “at a time when the economy thirst[ed] for credit to sustain 
an economic recovery.”326 Regulators subsequently changed tacks and 
sought to cap debit rather than credit interchange out of fears that a 
decrease in credit supply could prolong the Recession. Senator Durbin 
was so convinced about the inevitability of consumer harm from 
regulating credit card interchange that he celebrated that unlike earlier 
proposals, his namesake Amendment would leave credit fees unchecked. 
It is impossible to know how banks would have responded to a cap 
on credit interchange fees. If the Australian case study is informative, 
then there is reason to believe the impact would have been a positive 
one: less cross-subsidization of the wealthy by the poor. Certainly, it is easy 
to understand why banks pushed against credit card interchange 
regulation: Credit interchange rates are higher and card issuers generate 
significant revenue from inducing consumers to use these cards with 
rewards.327 One bank executive describes Durbin as the “lesser of two 
evils” when it came to interchange regulation, stating “we would have 
preferred no regulation, but if they were going to do something, better 
debit than credit.”328 
The ability of industry to shape regulation is precisely why economist 
George Stigler was wary of the regulatory project. Stigler’s central thesis 
was that regulation would inevitably be “acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit.”329 The watering down of 
interchange reform illustrates Stigler’s concerns. For consumer financial 
regulation to serve consumers, regulators must be skeptical of how so-
phisticated financial firms describe their likely response to regulation. 
Being too beholden to concerns voiced by industry can dismantle poten-
tially useful interventions. 
2. Listening to Banks Can Lead to Pessimism About the Efficacy of 
Regulation. — Policymakers are not alone in mistakenly relying on banks’ 
warnings about the likely impact of regulatory interventions; some 
academics rush to believe banks too. As a result, two prominent recent 
articles—one by Professor Lauren Willis and another by Professors Bubb 
and Pildes—are overly pessimistic about the efficacy of consumer finan-
cial regulation.330 These authors start from the premise that banks are 
sophisticated and consumers naive, and as a result relatively light-touch 
regulatory interventions can never be effective, because sophisticated 
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banks will always pass the costs of regulation on to consumers.331 This 
criticism is bolstered by the fact that banks say that they will engage in 
exactly the offsetting behavior that these authors are concerned with. 
However, when we study what banks do, rather than what they say, we 
realize that such extreme skepticism about the consumer financial regu-
latory project is unfounded. 
This fact is well illustrated by the overdraft case study. As Professors 
Bubb and Pildes helpfully point out, consumer markets are not static, 
and so theoretically we expect firms to adjust to regulation.332 The magni-
tude of this adjustment, though, is an empirical question. Just because 
banks say that consumers will bear the incidence of regulatory inter-
vention does not mean that they will—who bears these costs depends on 
competitive dynamics in financial markets that banks themselves may not 
appreciate ex ante and certainly have no incentive to honestly convey to 
regulators if they do understand them. 
The perception that banks are sophisticated and offset any “light-
touch” regulation leads Professor Willis and Professors Bubb and Pildes 
to misrely on incomplete data and anecdotal evidence rather than empir-
ically assessing the incidence of the regulations they study. Incidentally, 
their influential critiques of behavioral policy approaches suffer from a 
behavioral problem themselves: They are anchored to the prior theory 
that light-touch regulation is ineffective and rely on confirming evidence, 
rather than thorough data-driven analysis. 
For example, Professor Lauren Willis cites vivid anecdotal evidence 
as proof of the failure of changes to the overdraft default rule: 
Consumers quickly realized that there is an immediate 
intangible benefit to opting out [of the no overdraft default]—
the marketing will stop. The calls and emails will cease, the 
tellers will stop asking, and those who bank online will be able 
to navigate directly to their personal account without clicking 
through a computer screen asking whether they would like to 
opt out first.333 
This dire picture is perhaps true of how some banks approached 
opting consumers in to overdraft following changes to the default rules. 
For instance, TCF manipulated consumers into opting in to overdraft 
protection with fear-inducing hypotheticals to convince consumers that 
failure to opt in would leave them and their families exposed in moments 
of distress. Branch employees—required to maintain an opt-in rate of 
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80% or more on all new accounts334—would combat resistance to opt-in 
by telling customers: 
We live in Minnesota too. It is cold outside. You are on the side 
of the road. Your account has $50 in it. You know to get a 
service call it is going to cost you $80. You have to get it fixed. 
So you make that call. If you are opted in, we will pay it. You get 
an overdraft fee. If you don’t Opt-In, it declines you. You might 
get stuck on the side of the road.335 
TCF, though, is the exception, not the rule. It was so reliant on 
overdraft that its former CEO, Richard Cooper, dubbed his yacht “The 
Overdraft.”336 Opt-in rates were more than three times the industry 
average337 and so aggressive that the CFPB investigated the bank for 
improper opt-in practices.338 Empirical evidence makes clear that overall, 
though, changes to the default rule were significantly welfare enhancing 
for consumers. Service charges on deposit accounts dropped by more 
than 15% immediately following this reform, and banks have not recov-
ered these losses. This sustained decline makes sense given that, as a 
result of this intervention, only 16% of bank customers are still eligible to 
incur overdraft fees.339 Prior to overdraft reform, all consumers were 
opted in to overdraft protection. Thus, changing this default rule de-
creased the share of customers even eligible to incur these fees by 84%. 
Professor Willis’s read of the evidence—that the new overdraft regime is 
not particularly successful in increasing consumer welfare—is wrong. 
Rather than aggressively nudging people toward overdraft as a 
product, many of the largest financial institutions, concerned about the 
notoriety of and potential legal liability from overdraft, moved away from 
it entirely. Bank of America, in a move heralded by the New York Times as 
bringing “an end to the $40 cup of coffee,” stopped charging overdraft 
fees for debit purchases.340 Bank of America also introduced a “safe-
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 340. Andrew Martin, Bank of America to End Debit Overdraft Fees, N.Y. Times (Mar. 
9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/ 
10overdraft.html [https://perma.cc/MYW9-YZ5Y]. 
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checking” product to help consumers who regularly incur penalty fees.341 
Furthermore, Wells Fargo no longer charges consumers overdraft fees on 
small-dollar transactions and offers its customers the opportunity to 
“rewind” overdraft incidents, removing fees for overdraft transactions as 
long as customers quickly replenish their accounts.342 Citigroup does not 
charge overdraft fees343 and JP Morgan also eliminated overdraft fees for 
small-dollar purchases.344 These large banks are especially relevant, given 
that together they are responsible for more than 40% of domestic 
deposits.345 This means that for four out of ten bank customers, postcrisis 
overdraft savings are even more significant than regulators hoped. 
Still, Professors Bubb and Pildes rely on what they call Willis’s 
“damning account of the failure of this regulatory approach” as evidence 
not only that the overdraft default rules failed to help consumers but 
more broadly that behavioral economics “trims its sails” by advocating 
for choice-preserving interventions.346 Their critique is that since large 
financial institutions are sophisticated, they have both the resources and 
the incentives to push consumers toward the choice that is most 
beneficial to the firm (in this setting, opting consumers into overdraft). 
In their view, the failure of the overdraft default rule reflects how, 
generally, light-touch regulatory interventions are doomed to futility. 
Instead, to help consumers, they suggest regulators need to embrace 
paternalistic policies, such as a blanket ban on overdraft protection. 
Far from a nudge gone awry, behavioral approaches to regulating 
overdraft were a resounding success. And there is substantial potential 
for additional behavioral interventions, such as “salience shocks” to alert 
customers to these fees immediately before they incur them: For 
example, in the United Kingdom, text alerts to consumers warning about 
low account balances decreased overdraft incidence by nearly 25%.347 
Past critiques of the efficacy of the new default rules illustrate how 
academics can be misled by analysis that relies on anecdotal evidence. 
The implications are significant: These influential critics of behav-
ioral law and economics approaches argue that behavioral policies do 
                                                                                                                           
 341. Melanie Hicken, BofA Rolls Out Checking Account for Chronic Overdrafters, 
CNN Money (Mar. 6, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/06/pf/bank-of-america-
overdraft/index.html [https://perma.cc/ST34-6UC6]. 
 342. Robert Barba, Wells Fargo Adds Overdraft Protection with Rewind, Bankrate 
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bankrate.com/banking/checking/wells-fargo-launches-overdraft-
rewind/ [https://perma.cc/5WJY-AE2E]. 
 343. Citi Protects Customers from Unnecessary Overdraft Fees, Citi (Mar. 10, 2010), 
https://blog.citigroup.com/2010/03/citi-statement-on-protecting-consumers-from-
unnecessary-overdraft-fees/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 344. Blake Ellis, Chase to Scrap Overdraft Fees for Purchases of $5 or Less, CNN 
Money (June 22, 2012), https://money.cnn.com/2012/06/22/pf/chase-overdraft-fees/ 
index.htm [https://perma.cc/N7FS-HAHY]. 
 345. Trefis Team & Great Speculations, Five Largest Banks, supra note 296.  
 346. See, e.g., Bubb & Pildes, supra note 53, at 1596, 1655–56. 
 347. Competition & Mkts. Auth., supra note 44. 
1586 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1519 
 
not deliver for consumers. As proof, they cite the failures of overdraft 
reform—except that the new overdraft default rules do achieve their 
ends and do enhance consumer welfare. Overdraft reform is a thorn in 
the side of critics of behavioral policy approaches, not a paradigmatic ex-
ample of its failings. The fact that prominent authors—whose work has 
prompted responses by regulators348 and garnered widespread media 
attention349—miss this proves that even thoughtful academics can be mis-
led by relying on their assumptions about how the market will respond to 
regulation. These assumptions are not baseless: There are theoretical 
reasons to think banks will work to offset regulation. And banks them-
selves say that they will offset the impact of regulation. But policy infer-
ences based on what banks say—rather than what we empirically observe 
that they do—leads to confusion not only about the efficacy of regu-
lations (like the overdraft default rule) but more broadly of an entire reg-
ulatory approach (behaviorally motivated consumer financial protection). 
Thankfully, in consumer finance in particular, academics have access 
to a wealth of data. Bank financial data are reported quarterly, and more 
timely snapshots are available to policymakers like economists at the Fed-
eral Reserve. Regulators conduct surveys of consumers to understand a 
variety of topics ranging from their decision to be unbanked350 to how 
they choose between payment methods.351 Proprietary data from large fi-
nancial institutions—for example, detailed credit and checking account 
transaction history352—allow for inferences about policy efficacy and the 
limits of consumer rationality. Determining the efficacy of regulation is 
ultimately an empirical question, and one this Article undertakes with 
surprising results. 
Table 2 below summarizes the lessons discussed in Part II. 
                                                                                                                           
 348. Peter Orszag & Cass R. Sunstein, Give People Choices, Not Edicts, Bloomberg 
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2013-12-05/give-people-
choices-not-edicts (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 349. Jill Priluck, The Overselling of Behavioral Economics, Reuters: The Great Debate 
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/11/20/the-overselling-of-
behavioral-economics (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 350. See, e.g., FDIC, Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, supra note 
93. 
 351. See, e.g., Claire Greene & Joanna Stavins, The 2016 and 2017 Surveys of 
Consumer Payment Choice: Summary Results 12 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., No. 18-3, 
2018), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/2018/ 
rdr1803.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QJW-Z2KQ]. 
 352. See, e.g., Peter Ganong & Pascal J. Noel, Consumer Spending During 
Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 25417, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25417.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/K6CZ-UQ7S] (using de-identified bank account data to find that spending 
drops significantly following the expiration of unemployment insurance benefits in a way 
that is inconsistent with rational models). 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF LESSONS 
Overall Lesson 
Specific Suggestions 
for Designing and 
Evaluating 
Regulatory Regime Examples 
Regulators Should Target 
Nonsalient Prices: 
Consumers suffer from 
behavioral problems 
(e.g., inattention and 
overoptimism). Banks 
exploit by charging 
high hidden fees. 
Direction regulation 
of nonsalient prices 
benefits consumers. 
Salience shock is a 
novel alternative. 
The CARD Act and overdraft 
reform increase consumer 
welfare. The proposed $5 
Durbin fee sparks outrage, and 
the U.K. alert that consumer 
accounts are low decreases 
overdraft incidence. 
Regulators Should 
Address Inequitable 
Cross-Subsidies: 
Essentially all consumer 
markets feature higher 
prices for poorer 
consumers. These 
higher prices subsidize 
lower costs for the 
wealthy. 
Consumer 
protection provides 
authority for 
intervention. 
Evaluate whether 
regulation increases 
fairness in consumer 
markets; not whether 
regulation benefits 
all consumers. 
UDAAP claims to change 
interchange market (for 
example, by limiting 
antisteering provisions) as 
alternative to antitrust 
litigation. Capping overdraft 
fees could have increased 
account fees, banning rewards 
cards may increase retail prices 
for the wealthy. Even so, these 
are desirable interventions to 
increase fairness. 
Regulators Should Watch 
What Firms Do, Not 
What They Say: Banks 
are incentivized to deter 
regulators by warning 
interventions will distort 
market. Relying on 
these assertions is a 
costly mistake. 
Listening to banks 
can lead to poorly 
designed regulation. 
Listening to banks 
can lead to 
unwarranted 
pessimism. 
Interchange regulation initially 
targeted credit cards, shifted to 
debit because banks warned of 
credit supply effect. Result is 
intervention that harms 
consumers. Leading academics 
believe—as banks warned—that 
financial institutions offset 
losses from overdraft default 
rule, rendering it ineffective. 
This is inaccurate: Consumers 
benefitted from intervention. 
CONCLUSION 
The pain ordinary consumers suffered during the Great Recession 
highlighted the ways in which financial markets were failing them. Policy-
makers responded, and some of the earliest postcrisis reforms sought to 
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tame consumer financial markets. This Article offers the first empirical 
analysis of the consumer reform agenda. 
This Article illustrates that progressive politicians who cheer all 
regulation as welfare enhancing are misguided, as are bank executives who 
warn that consumers will be harmed, not helped, by well-intentioned 
interventions. The reality is more nuanced, and by drawing lessons from 
postcrisis regulation in the debit, credit, and overdraft markets, this Arti-
cle offers a roadmap for how to regulate effectively.   
Its lessons are threefold. First, banks understand consumers’ behav-
ioral limitations and exploit the fact that many are inattentive and mis-
estimate the likelihood of incurring penalty fees. Specifically, financial 
institutions often charge exorbitant nonsalient prices without worrying 
about losing customers. Policymakers should rein in on such pricing 
practices through regulation. 
Second, the consumer finance markets I study feature cross-subsidies 
running from the low income to the wealthy. Low-income consumers are 
more likely to bear penalty fees, because they tend to be both less 
attentive and more likely to overdraft or miss a credit card payment since 
they have less money in their bank accounts. High-income consumers are 
also advantaged because they alone have access to the most-attractive 
financial products, like rewards cards. Because retail prices are uniform, 
low- and high-income consumers pay the same prices; however, only 
high-income consumers receive kickbacks in the form of generous 
rewards. The existence of inequitable cross-subsidization in financial 
markets justifies intervention on consumer protection grounds. 
Finally, I argue that policymakers and academics should be guided 
by what banks do—not what they say. Financial institutions have every 
incentive to discourage regulators from curbing their behavior. As such, 
every time policymakers propose a change, they warn that the result will 
be higher consumer costs and less access to financial products. Theoreti-
cally, it makes sense that banks will offset the impact of regulation: In the 
contest between sophisticated, optimizing financial institutions and 
naive, non-optimizing consumers, the power seems to lie with the sophis-
ticates. However, the empirical results in this paper illustrate that finan-
cial institutions’ assertions about how consumers will end up bearing the 
costs of regulation are often overstated. These findings are surprising 
and differ significantly from prior work. In the past, influential legal aca-
demics have argued against light-touch regulation, suggesting that more 
paternalistic approaches are necessary to protect irrational consumers in 
these markets. This Article corrects this misconception. 
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APPENDIX: WHY DO INEQUITABLE CROSS-SUBSIDIES EXIST? 
Each of the postcrisis interventions studied in this Article feature 
inequitable cross-subsidization. Practically, less-sophisticated, poorer con-
sumers pay higher prices than their more-sophisticated, wealthier coun-
terparts. These inequities can exist when banks have significant market 
power, but they can also exist in perfectly competitive markets, and com-
petitive dynamics dictate whether banks or sophisticated consumers bear 
the incidence of regulation. This Appendix provides a simple conceptual 
framework to establish the winners and losers from regulation to address 
cross-subsidies in different settings. It illustrates that intervention to 
decrease cross-subsidization is always desirable as it benefits unsophisti-
cated consumers, who are currently disadvantaged in financial markets.353 
A.  Shrouded Prices and Perfectly Competitive Markets 
Banks regularly hide certain prices from consumers.354 Card issuers 
advertise low up-front pricing (for example, the introductory APR in 
large letters on envelopes to potential customers) but hide add-on costs 
those same customers are likely to incur (for example, higher interest 
                                                                                                                           
 353.  Some may argue that price discrimination by financial institutions is not 
inequitable cross-subsidization because it reflects the different costs of serving different 
types of consumers. For example, low-income consumers may use branch services more, 
which may result in them bearing overdraft fees to cover the cost of those services. This 
explanation struggles to explain why different prices should be borne by inattentive, low-
income customers instead of their attentive counterparts. Of course, understanding how 
cross-subsidization interacts with the costs of servicing it is important and merits additional 
attention.  See, e.g., Chris Nichols, Improving Customer Profitability Without a Profitability 
System, CenterState Correspondent Div. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://csbcorrespondent.com/ 
blog/improving-customer-profitability-without-profitability-system [https://perma.cc/P2XR- 
NMYJ] (“It is almost impossible for banks to earn excess profits by delivering banking 
products to indigent people or businesses.”). 
 354. These insights are related to a long line of both legal and economics literature 
that considers loss-leader pricing and its equilibrium effects on consumers and firms. See, 
e.g., Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing, 120 Q.J. Econ. 585, 589 (2005) (present-
ing an equilibrium where high shrouded prices are not competed away because there is no 
incentive for firms to compete on these costs); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 149 (model-
ing markets with sophisticated firms exploiting consumers’ behavioral biases). Many pa-
pers around this time provide empirical evidence on this phenomenon. See, e.g., Stefano 
DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 694, 
694–96 (2006) (noting that consumers who choose monthly gym memberships typically 
pay more than they would have paid on a pay-per-visit contract because they overestimate 
their future gym attendance); Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for 
News, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“On topics where reader beliefs diverge . . . 
newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions. Yet in the aggregate, 
a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective.”); Haiyan Shui 
& Lawrence M. Ausubel, Consumer Time Inconsistency: Evidence from a Market Experi-
ment in the Credit Card Market 2–3 (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“This ex ante preference [for credit cards with lower introductory 
rates] becomes puzzling after observing that respondents, ex post, keep on borrowing on 
this card well after introductory periods.”). 
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rates when the introductory teaser offers expire and penalty fees for late 
payments). This framework sheds light on why price shrouding occurs, its 
consequences, and why it persists in equilibrium. 
Consider the consumer checking account. For simplicity, imagine it 
has two components: a salient price ps (the monthly maintenance fee on 
the account) and a nonsalient price pns, (the overdraft fee charged to a cus-
tomer for an overdraft incident). Assume ps is $90, pns is $20. First, note 
that the existence of price shrouding leads to excessive credit card bor-
rowing,355 excessive use of credit or debit cards to pay for transactions,356 
and, in this example, too many checking accounts. How so? Assume 
there are two types of consumers, high-value consumers who derive a 
benefit of $110 from the consumer checking account, and low-value 
consumers, who derive a benefit of only $90. All consumers will need 
overdraft protection, but no consumers think they will. If costs were 
properly internalized by consumers, only high-value types would pur-
chase checking accounts; however, believing the total cost is only $90, 
both high- and low-value types will purchase them. 
Now assume awareness of the nonsalient overdraft differs depending 
on customer sophistication. There are still two types of consumers: 
sophisticated, who consider both ps and pns when they make product 
decisions, and unsophisticated, who neglect pns. Each values the checking 
account at $100 precisely, Sneaky Bank’s total cost of providing a check-
ing account. Sophisticated customers avoid overdraft fees and pay only 
$90 for their checking accounts; unsophisticated customers know no bet-
ter and pay $110, both the $90 monthly fee and a $20 overdraft fee. This 
numerical example is summarized below. 
TABLE 3: SNEAKY BANK EXAMPLE 
Sneaky Bank   
Cost $100 
Ps (fee) $90 
Pns (overdraft) $20 
Customer  
Sophisticated pays  $90 
Unsophisticated pays  $110 
Profit  $0 
                                                                                                                           
 355. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 249 
(2006) (noting that “excessive borrowing, no less than insufficient savings, might be a 
product of bounded rationality”). 
 356. Bar-Gill, supra note 130, at 1377 (highlighting that “teaser rates lead to excessive 
pre-distress borrowing, which in turn renders the consumer more vulnerable to financial 
hardships”). 
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But what is to stop a competing bank from entering and being 
transparent about its pricing structure? If Transparent Bank offers a $100 
price, inclusive of overdraft, and advertises that it does not engage in 
sneaky price shrouding, newly educated consumers would still prefer 
checking accounts at Sneaky Bank: Because they are now sophisticated, 
they will get a product worth $100 for only $90, plus some inconvenience 
cost to avoid overdrafting.357 
The result is an equilibrium in which Sneaky Bank charges high add-
on overdraft fees to exploit unsophisticated customers, and sophisticated 
customers take advantage of Sneaky Bank by avoiding high add-on costs 
and getting below-cost checking accounts. Unsophisticated consumers 
pay more, thereby subsidizing their sophisticated counterparts. 
Sophistication is costly on two dimensions: Sophisticated consumers 
must (1) read through complex checking account contracts to locate non-
salient terms and (2) be vigilant in avoiding fees—for example, by regu-
larly verifying that their account balances are positive, or by carrying cash 
to make sure they will never incur overdraft fees. But as long as the total 
cost of understanding contract provisions, checking account balances, 
and keeping cash handy is below $10, sophisticated consumers will still 
prefer expending this effort to Transparent Bank’s $100 account. 
What role can regulatory intervention play?358 Consider a regulator 
that is aware of shrouded prices and heterogeneous customer sophistica-
tion and intervenes, perhaps by capping the overdraft fee at $0.359 Now, 
banks can no longer charge pns but still need to cover their $100 costs in 
equilibrium. As such, Sneaky Bank would fully offset this price regulation 
through an increase in ps: 
                                                                                                                           
 357. This example is a simplistic version of the model presented in Gabaix & Laibson, 
supra note 149. The authors refer to the failure of the transparent seller to gain market 
share as illustrative of the “curse of debiasing”: “Sophisticated consumers tend to be less 
profitable because they know how to avoid unnecessary costs. In such cases, firms do not 
have an incentive to pursue debiasing, and competition will not lead consumers to behave 
rationally.” Id. at 507–09. 
 358. Gabaix and Laibson briefly consider regulatory solutions for shrouded pricing, 
for example, enhanced disclosure and warning customers to pay attention to hidden costs. 
Id. at 530. They are not very encouraging about the potential of regulatory price caps: 
“[E]ven if good theoretical arguments exist for regulating shrouded fees, such regulations 
put us on a slippery slope that may produce great unintended harm. Mark-up regulations 
are often counterproductive.” Id. at 531. I heed this caution and attempt to highlight cases 
where price caps are likely to be minimally distortive. 
 359. This is an extreme example, and illustrative only. For reasons discussed in section 
II.B.2 above, I believe capping overdraft fees at $0 is undesirable because it will eliminate a 
product that consumers may want despite its high cost. A more desirable cap would be to 
restrict overdraft fees to the cost of offering overdraft protection. 
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TABLE 4: SNEAKY BANK IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE, REGULATED MARKET 
Sneaky Bank  
Cost $100 
Ps (fee) $100 
Pns (overdraft) $0 
Customer  
Sophisticated pays  $100 
Unsophisticated pays  $100 
Profit  $0 
In equilibrium, this regulatory intervention eliminates the cross-
subsidy of the sophisticated by the unsophisticated (that is, of the wealthy 
by the low-income).360 This benefit alone is sufficient to justify regulatory 
intervention on distributional grounds: A price cap can tilt the scales 
away from sophisticated consumers who have access to the checking 
account at a price below cost because of their less-sophisticated counter-
parts. As an added benefit, regulation also eliminates costly behavior by the 
sophisticated, like spending copious time checking account balances to 
avoid being overdrawn. Also, tackling price shrouding eliminates any in-
efficient overuse of the consumer checking account product. A con-
sumer will weigh the marginal benefit of a checking account against its 
true cost, not an underestimated cost that ignores nonsalient price 
attributes. 
Thus, even in a perfectly competitive world, the existence of price 
shrouding suggests a role for regulatory intervention to eliminate inequi-
table cross-subsidies. Note that this Article proposes behavioral differ-
ences between the two groups of consumers in this framework: sophisti-
                                                                                                                           
 360. One question for those interested in these topics is why greater product diversity 
does not exist in the checking account market. For example, in this simplified 
hypothetical, it is possible to imagine a checking account without any overdraft protection 
being offered at a lower fee than a checking account with overdraft protection, because 
banks bear costs for offering overdraft protection. Literature in economics suggests that 
imperfect competition can result in too little (but also too much) product diversity, 
depending on consumer demand. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 297, 297 
(1977) (noting that in scale economies, greater efficiency can be achieved by producing 
large quantities of fewer goods, but this “leaves less variety, which entails some welfare 
loss”); A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 Bell J. Econ. 417, 428 
(1975) (concluding that in cases of unregulated monopolies, the “selection of product 
characteristics is likely to be biased away from the social optimum”). Interestingly, Bank of 
America recently reduced its product diversity, eliminating its low-cost eBanking checking 
accounts. See Colin Dwyer, Bank of America Ends Free Checking Option, A Bastion for 
Low-Income Customers, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/01/24/580324251/bank-of-america-ends-free-checking-option-a-bastion-for-low-
income-customers [https://perma.cc/6TB8-F7Q7]. 
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cated and aware of nonsalient prices and unsophisticated and unaware. 
An alternative is a rational framework: Some consumers have low mar-
ginal utility of income and thus are likely to use overdraft protection ra-
ther than expend energy reading contracts, hoarding cash, or searching 
for cheaper checking account alternatives. That is, wealthy consumers are 
likely to take advantage of an expensive overdraft add-on, and low-income 
consumers are likely to avoid it. This “traditional” explanation361 also 
generates a cross-subsidy that can be addressed by regulation, but it runs 
in the opposite direction, from the wealthy to the low income, and so the 
distributional case for intervention is less clear. However, this traditional 
model appears unlikely to describe the reality of consumer finance mar-
kets, where consumers who bear penalty fees are disproportionately 
poorer and less financially sophisticated. With the behavioral cross-sub-
sidy running from the less sophisticated to the more sophisticated, 
regulatory intervention can be justified on fairness and distributional 
grounds. 
B.  Shrouded Prices and Imperfect Competition 
Next, consider a world without perfect competition, with banks that 
possess substantial market power. At least in the short run, banks in an 
imperfectly competitive market are able to generate positive profits, or 
rents.362 So, for example, Sneaky Bank can charge $105 for its checking 
account, even though it costs only $100 to provide. Without regulatory 
intervention, sophisticated consumers pay $105, and unsophisticated 
consumers pay a whopping $125 for their checking accounts.363 
  
                                                                                                                           
 361. So termed by Ellison, supra note 354, at 586. 
 362. The particular nature of the nonperfectly competitive market (monopoly versus 
monopolistic competition) will dictate whether firms are able to generate quasi-rents 
(positive profits in the short run that will be competed away over time) or long-run rents. 
 363. The analyses in Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra 
note 19, and Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 19, are closely related to this example. In their 
studies of the CARD Act, both sets of authors point to (1) the shrouded nature of many of 
the fees the CARD Act sought to regulate and (2) the imperfectly competitive card-issuer 
market as theoretical explanations for their finding only limited offset of CARD Act losses. 
See Agarwal et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products, supra note 19, at 152–53; Bar-
Gill & Bubb, supra note 19, at 971–72. 
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TABLE 5: SNEAKY BANK IN AN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE, UNREGULATED 
MARKET 
Sneaky Bank   
Cost $100 
Ps (fee) $105 
Pns (overdraft) $20 
Customer  
Sophisticated pays  $105 
Unsophisticated pays  $125 
Profit  $30
The difference between this imperfectly competitive case and the 
baseline of perfect competition is that now the beneficiary of the unso-
phisticated consumers’ irrationality is Sneaky Bank, not the sophisticated 
consumers. 
Why could sophisticated consumers not demand a lower price by 
threatening to educate the unsophisticated? This threat is not obviously 
credible. Sophisticated consumers would have to coordinate to spread 
their message; and, even if they were able to, it is likely that unsophisti-
cated consumers would trust Sneaky Bank, the provider of their checking 
accounts, over the less-familiar sophisticated. 
A cap on the shrouded overdraft fee can help decrease checking 
account costs for the unsophisticated consumer. Imagine the same 
regulatory intervention as above: Regulators cap overdraft fees at $0. In 
the perfectly competitive world, Sneaky Bank has to raise its price to 
cover its marginal costs. In this imperfectly competitive world, Sneaky 
Bank has positive profits and may not offset the losses from the non-
salient price cap entirely,364 because its customers decide whether to 
open (and maintain) a checking account based on the salient monthly 
fee. That is, Sneaky Bank faces a trade-off: Raise salient fees for everyone 
and lower the quantity of checking accounts it provides, or keep salient 
fees as they are and still generate positive, albeit lower, profits than it 
would generate in the absence of price regulation. 
Note that the possibility of incomplete offset is attributable to the 
fact that some consumers ignore nonsalient prices. There would be no 
similar tradeoff if regulators instead targeted salient prices—as long as 
there are other aspects of the pricing bundle to adjust, banks will fully 
offset losses. 
  
                                                                                                                           
 364. The degree of bank offset will depend on the elasticity of consumer demand. 
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TABLE 6: SNEAKY BANK IN AN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE, REGULATED 
MARKET 
Bank  
Cost $100 
Ps (fee) $105 
Pns (overdraft) $0 
Customer  
Sophisticated pays  $105 
Unsophisticated pays  $105 
Profit  $5 
C.  Extension: A World Without Price Shrouding 
What if no salience problem exists, and yet undesirable cross-
subsidies remain? This describes the interchange market. Suppose 
merchants pay a set fee of $2 in interchange expense for processing a 
credit transaction. When a consumer buys a $100 pair of shoes with cash, 
all of the money goes to the merchant; but when the consumer pays with 
credit, the merchant only receives $98 ($100 minus $2 of interchange 
expense). The merchant would like to pass on the $2 in interchange ex-
pense to the card-using consumer directly, but this is illegal.365 So instead, 
the merchant charges $101 to both consumers. If all consumers paid in 
cash, the merchant would set prices at cost ($100). So, unsophisticated 
consumers, without access to credit cards, end up paying higher prices to 
cover interchange costs associated with their wealthier counterparts’ 
credit instruments. That is, they subsidize the rewards these consumers 
accrue. 
Regulatory intervention can usefully address this cross-subsidy. For 
example, by facilitating merchant price discrimination, regulators can 
help ensure that the customers who benefit from transacting with 
rewards cards (the sophisticated) pay higher retail prices. Importantly, 
this is not a Pareto improvement, where one class of consumers is made 
better off without hurting any other group. In a perfectly competitive 
                                                                                                                           
 365. This is a simplification, although legal and contractual barriers do exist to price 
discrimination—for example, state-level prohibitions on merchant surcharging and 
contract terms that disallow merchants from steering consumers toward cheaper forms of 
payment. Such measures were at the heart of two recent Supreme Court cases involving 
card networks. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287–90 (2018) (declining to 
find that antisteering contract provisions precluding merchants from discouraging the use 
of a company’s credit cards had sufficient anticompetitive effects to trigger an antitrust 
violation); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) 
(holding a New York statute regulating how merchants communicate credit card 
surcharge pricing implicated First Amendment concerns). 
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market, Pareto improvement is not possible. Instead, sophisticated 
consumers are being made worse off. They no longer pay below-cost 
prices, with rewards like airline miles subsidized by high retail prices paid 
by the unsophisticated. Although not welfare improving overall, regula-
tion increases fairness in this market by forcing consumers who benefit 
from rewards cards to bear the costs of these financial transactions. 
TABLE 7: SNEAKY BANK IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH NO 
SHROUDING 
Merchant Cost $100 
Option 1: $100 retail price 
Customer pays  $100 
Merchant receives  
Sophisticated (credit) $100-$2=$98 
Unsophisticated (cash) $100 
Profit  ($2) 
Option 2: $101 retail price 
Customer pays  $101 
Merchant receives  
Sophisticated (credit) $101-$2=$99 
Unsophisticated (cash) $101 
Profit  $0 
Option 3: Regulation allows price discrimination
Customer pays   
Sophisticated (credit) $102 
Unsophisticated (cash) $100 
Merchant receives  
Sophisticated (credit) $102-$2=$100 
Unsophisticated (cash) $100 
Profit  $0 
 
 
